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Abstract
Traditional epistemology deals with questions about the possible sources of knowledge, the
conditions which make a belief an item of knowledge, and the extent to which we can know, as
well as the nature of justification and what can make a belief justified for someone. Evolutionary
epistemology (EE) breaks from TE to avoid its perceived shortcomings by both dismissing some
traditional questions and emphasizing new, related questions that are more readily answerable
given what we know about the biology and phylogenetic history of humans. The new questions
assume that we are physical, naturally evolved beings and that cognition can be studied by
methods of natural science. This thesis reviews the emergence of EE, summarizing the
arguments that have been made by its major proponents, clarifies two points that are neglected in
the literature, and ends with a discussion of some criticisms and limitations of EE as well as
work that remains to be done. The first point I clarify is that the program in EE of studying the
evolution of epistemological mechanisms (EEM) is logically distinct from the program of
building an evolutionary epistemology of theories (EET). I argue that EET does not gain validity
from the fact that cognitive mechanisms have evolved and does not stand or fall with EEM. The
second point I clarify is that adherents to EE need not see it as replacing or superseding TE. A
complementary view of EE with TE is both viable and potentially fruitful.
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Naturalizing Knowledge: The Project of Evolutionary Epistemology
As an area of philosophical inquiry, epistemology deals with theory of knowledge and the
topic of justified belief. Included among the questions of epistemology are questions about the
possible sources of knowledge, the conditions which make a belief an item of knowledge, and
the extent to which we can know. Concerning justified belief, the problems concern the nature of
justification and what can make a belief justified for someone (Steup 2005). We need to either
explain how it’s possible to acquire knowledge and justified beliefs, or, unless we assume that
some things are in fact known, we should determine whether knowledge is altogether impossible.
This epistemology has been around since Plato’s days. Call it traditional epistemology (TE).
We shall distinguish TE from the evolutionary approach, which includes the naturalistic,
or naturalized, approach to epistemology. Evolutionary epistemology (EE) is not an entirely
different thing; otherwise there’d be no point in drawing a contrast. EE breaks from TE to avoid
its perceived shortcomings by both dismissing some traditional questions and emphasizing new,
related questions that are more readily answerable given what we know about the biology and
phylogenetic history of humans. The new questions assume that we are physical, naturally
evolved beings in a natural world and that our cognition can be studied by methods of natural
science (Campbell 1987, p. 165). Some proponents of this position argue that no progress, or at
least not much progress, had been made in TE, and they argue that science can help answer
questions of epistemology (Bradie and Harms 2017; Quine 1969). In particular, the focus of
study is how we as natural beings learn and adapt and what affects our belief-forming processes.
EE organizes a set of core premises which are used for concrete philosophical and
scientific theories explaining cognition and learning processes. It is naturalistic in its emphasis
of using concepts and methods that are valid in the natural sciences and in its dedication to some
ontological and epistemological realism as presupposed in science. The EE approach grounds
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theories in experience by starting with what we know from science rather than with what we
know a priori. EE is aimed mostly at providing descriptive accounts of knowledge and only
minimal, if any, normative conclusions. Finally, EE is interdisciplinary to the extent that it views
knowledge and learning as phenomena to be studied by the methods of evolutionary biology,
psychology, and philosophy.
The first core principle of EE is that humans and their organs, like all other animals with
their organs, have evolved naturally and that this indicates that some aspects of the way we think
can be explained in evolutionary terms. The brain, central nervous system, and the associated
components of the ratiomorphic apparatus—the sum of all information-gaining and informationprocessing organs (Wuketits 1990, p. 77)—have evolved naturally and are constrained by their
phylogenetic history, so it seems reasonable to suppose that the biological theory of evolution
can contribute to the study of epistemological mechanisms. As Donald Campbell, the person
who coined the term evolutionary epistemology, puts it, “An evolutionary epistemology would
be at minimum an epistemology taking cognizance of and compatible with man’s status as a
product of biological and social evolution” (1974, p. 413).
In his early work in EE, Campbell developed the influential metaphor taking the process
of evolution itself as a learning and cognition process. The ratiomorphic apparatus is thus an
abstraction from any particular physical substrates of cognition, in this broadly metaphorical
sense, as it’s present in essentially all life; so the human ratiomorphic apparatus is the object of
study in epistemology. Viewing evolution as cognition has become a core theme in EE, the aim
being to capture the idea that the way information changes through phylogenesis and is stored in
DNA is analogous to the way an organism learns and develops during its lifetime, a process of
ontogenesis. Thus EE discards most of the distinction between phylogenesis and ontogenesis,
even though in evolutionary biology it is recognized that models of phylogenesis account for
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change in terms of mechanisms significantly different from the mechanisms that account for an
organism’s development during its lifetime (Gontier 2006, pp. 11–12; Bradie and Harms 2017).
This move in EE is not accidental. It is due to another major program in EE, which is about
describing cultural learning and change, especially theory change in science, using evolutionary
theory. Here the scientific theory of organic evolution is applied to explain, and sometimes to
justify, the development of science.
This thesis reviews the historical emergence of EE as a field in philosophy, summarizing
the arguments that have been made by its major proponents, clarifies two points that appear to be
neglected in the literature, and ends with a discussion of some criticisms and limitations of EE as
well as work that remains to be done. The first point I’ll clarify is that the program in EE of
studying the evolution of epistemological mechanisms (EEM) is logically distinct from the
program of building an evolutionary epistemology of theories (EET). I argue that EET does not
gain validity from the fact that cognitive mechanisms have evolved and does not stand or fall
with EEM. The second point I’ll clarify is that adherents to EE need not, contrary to the opinion
of some philosophers, see it as replacing or superseding TE. A complementary view of EE with
TE is both viable and potentially fruitful.
Historical Background and Philosophical Motivations for EE
As all important ideas in philosophy, evolutionary epistemology did not appear in a
vacuum, and its precursors may be noticed even in writings by Hume and Locke. To be sure, it
was only in the early 20th century that there appeared specifically evolutionary epistemologies in
the Darwinian sense, after evolutionary science acquired its broad acceptance. The following
section is organized to highlight the shortcomings of traditional approaches to epistemology and
to explain the motivations for a new, naturalistic, evolutionary approach.
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Early Modern Epistemology’s Relevance to EE
The foundationalist approach of Descartes, sometimes considered the start of the modern
or early-modern era of epistemology, exemplifies what I’m here calling traditional epistemology.
Descartes recognized that we should not simply presume that we have reliable sensory access to
the external world or that we are fully capable of valid inference. Each of these two possibilities
and any other claim, if not so obvious that it cannot be consistently doubted, needs to be shown
by way of argument. The proposed method requires us to “raze everything to the ground” before
we carefully admit only those beliefs which cannot be doubted, which make the foundations
upon which beliefs can be firmly based (Ariew & Watkins 2009, pp. 40–41). Thus Descartes
begins by subjecting every belief to total scrutiny, building upon undoubtable truths and deriving
other acceptable beliefs. Furthermore, Descartes takes his knowledge of the necessary existence
of an omnipotent, benevolent, non-deceiving God as what many other beliefs depend on, and he
even mounts an argument for the existence of external material things on the premise that God
would not allow him to be totally mistaken about his sensory perceptions (pp. 51, 60–61, 64).
Descartes relates to EE in a couple different ways. One lesson is that Descartes’s starting
point offers him no straightforward way to establish much, such the reliability of our senses,
without relying on an omnipotent and benevolent God or something providing the same trusted
grounding. Descartes’s position on this issue served more as a springboard against which EE and
naturalistic epistemology in general offered a non-foundationalist approach (Quine 1990, p. 19).
EE views Descartes’s efforts as demonstrating the shortcomings of the foundationalist approach,
and instead EE suggest that we lend credence to beliefs, not based on our inability to doubt them,
but on their reliability for our living conditions (Campbell 1987, p. 166).
Additionally, EE discards the suggestion that the mind is an immaterial thing but picks up
the important thesis that the mind has innate truths and capacities (c.f., the third Meditation). In
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fact, years before Descartes, Bacon had written that the human mind has innate tendencies,
especially to think in certain fallacious ways because of the idola tribus that plague the mind
(New Organon, Book 1.41). EE accepts that our cognitive faculties are shaped by innate
structures—innate hypotheses actually, as we’ll see (Riedl 1984, pp. 40–44). But all innate
components of the mind become the facts that need a naturalistic explanation, consistent with
evolutionary science, and no longer invoking the works of a God.1
Insofar as naturalistic epistemology emphasizes empirical experience, it appears to have
roots among philosophers such as John Locke and David Hume, who emphasized empirical
experience as the ultimate source of any of our beliefs. This position was admitted as the starting
point in later epistemologies that emphasized our biological constraints as beings in nature.
About Locke, we should note that he believed that each person assumes there is an
external world even though you can’t prove it. Locke believed that you could get yourself to
doubt external reality only as an academic exercise, and the human mind works in a way that
enables us to get around and do whatever we need for our survival and wellbeing. Our mental
faculties, though often imperfect for abstract concepts, are “suited … to the preservation of us in
whom they are, and accommodated to the use of life, they serve to our purpose well enough”
(Ariew & Watkins 2009, p. 413, An Essay IV.XI.8). So our cognitive faculties are sufficient for
any practical needs we have. This view is consistent with the claim in EE that evolution has built
a realist conception of the world into the ratiomorphic apparatus, so it does not matter what
abstract philosophical views you have so long as you act as if you’re a realist about the world.
Hume advances the view that we rely on reasoning principles that are not demonstrably

1

Consider the contrast with Descartes: “it is not astonishing that in creating me, God should

have endowed me with this idea [that there is a God], so that it would be like the mark of the
craftsman impressed upon his work” (Ariew & Watkins 2009, p. 53, Meditations 3).

7

justifiable as are, for example, theorems of mathematics. Hume shows that some of the ways we
think, such as certain kinds of inference, are driven by custom or habit even though stemming
from past empirical experiences. Take the prime example of the relation of cause and effect, on
which is founded all reasoning dealing with matters of empirical fact (EHU IV.I.4).2 Causal
inference is not determined by a process of reasoning or by knowledge of “the secret power by
which the one object produces the other” (EHU V.I.4–5). We discover the causal properties of an
object only by observing it in empirical experience, and we assert and believe in particular causal
relations only because we’ve been exposed in experience to events occurring simultaneously or
closely in time and place. In fact, we never actually observe causation, only that some “particular
objects are constantly conjoined with each other” (EHU IV.I.6, IV.I.10). Therefore, we do not
know generalizations about nature a priori, and all statements about facts of the empirical world
could conceivably be refuted in experience.
As it turns out, these insights by Hume have influenced much of philosophy of science
over the years, and approaches such as EE that focus on empirical experience have taken these
points as axiomatic. One conclusion we can draw out here is that statements about nature have
no necessity about them. Moreover, it is likely impossible to show by a priori arguments alone
that reasoning about, for example, causation or necessary regularities in the world is legitimate.
The stance of EE is that we can instead lend weight to the fact that there are many cases of
convergence of theories and methods across disciplines in science (Vollmer 2004, p. 209).
We’re left with the question of whether we get an accurate picture of the external world
by our sensory and reasoning faculties. If experience is our only guide in reasoning about matters
of fact, what must we admit if the human mind itself contributes to perception and cognition?

2

References to Hume come from Ariew & Watkins 2009, pp. 517–600; EHU stands for An

Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
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How do our ideas correspond to what’s out in the world? To some extent, Immanuel Kant has
provided an answer that accounts for the mind’s innate structure, an answer which EE reformulates and adjusts in light of modern evolutionary theory.
Another Approach with Immanuel Kant
In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sees himself as ushering in a new era in philosophy.
He contends that traditional metaphysics had not made significant progress since the days of the
classical Greeks, a fact he believed was due to the wrong approach philosophers had been taking
(Kant 1996, B xiv–xvi) 3. Metaphysics had been “a mere groping about” (B xv). Kant states that
his task in the Critique is to follow the example by Copernicus and “transform the procedure
previously followed in metaphysics, by subjecting metaphysics to a complete revolution” (B
xxii). In particular, Kant attempts to demonstrate how we can take an inside-out approach to the
problem of epistemology and re-orient the observer relative to the object of interest. (Nevermind
the fact that Copernicus took the observer from the center to instead revolve around the sun.)
Now we no longer are to follow Hume and Locke (and others) in saying that our cognition
conforms to experience—that the external world directly provides us with impressions. We must
reverse the picture and consider what the cognizer, with their in-built structures and concepts of
understanding, does in order to have an appearance of external phenomena (A 85). Objects of
experience conform to cognition, and we cannot access anything that lies beyond the appearance
(B xvi–xviii). The profoundly influential idea here was that the mind contributes to the way
perception and internal deliberation occur in the understanding.
Kant agrees with Hume and Locke that each legitimate metaphysical concept has a kind
of “acquisition story” that explains the concept’s empirical origins. He thinks that contentful
ideas must arise through sensibility even though the a priori categories do not and cannot have

3

References to Kant follow the unified A/B system of the 1781/1787 editions of the Critique.
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an “empirical deduction” (A 28, 75, 85–86). The categories are not determined by anything
about the external world itself; and they are more like capacities for organizing your ideas in the
unity of your conscious mind (A 80). Yet somehow this is supposed to make certain kinds of
inference in science justified, including causal explanations, so that we need not succumb to the
skepticism that Hume could not avoid because he could not sanction enough of the right
cognitive resources for us to be able to do physics (A 94). Still, Kant’s transcendental deduction
of the categories is not a purely rationalist thing but is motivated by our encounters with the
categories in reasoning experiences (A 86–89).
Kant in the end does not explain where the particular a priori categories and forms of
intuition that we have come from. They’re simply there, open to analysis, but we cannot explain
their presence. And it is this problem that makes Kant relevant to evolutionary epistemology. As
it turns out, the two views that there are a priori categories which necessarily dictate the kinds of
thoughts we can have and that our mind does not receive raw signals from the sensory organs
uninterpreted are common notions in the EE literature (Gontier 2006, p. 4; Riedl 1984, p. 46). In
short, EE picks up where Kant left us. EE is the “attempt to explain a priori structures of our
knowledge via evolution and to ‘dynamize’ these structures” (Wuketits 1984, p. 4). The Kantian
categories end up having this phylogenetic relativity.
Interestingly, that the categories need not be what they are—that there is no necessity
about their actual shape—is consistent with Kant’s view that the categories or forms of judgment
which are common to all humans may be wholly different for other forms of life (B 152). Other
creatures could have awareness of presentations without the unity that consciousness provides
and thus without the ability to distinguish between presentations (A 103, B 415). An important
distinction, however, is that Kant thinks that, even though humans and animals have sensation,
only humans have thought; so reason and understanding are specifically human powers (A 546–
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547). Categories are structures of thought, and animals don’t have thought. Also, even though
human forms of intuition are open to us for examination, we can never know what forms of
intuition animals utilize. This sharp Kantian distinction between humans and animals is
discarded in EE. We consider humans to be crucially similar to animals in their genetic and
physical makeup, and the physical substrates of thought are essential to any cognitive
performance. What is retained from Kant is that structures innate to the mind of the human
species (encoded in the DNA) are what make our kind of perception of reality possible.
EE admits that we each have beliefs controlled in part by higher-level mental structures
that we may not be able to explain. As Campbell puts it, “we should also accept epistemic
humility, recognising the profound indirection and presumptiveness of even our best visual
perception and science. We do not know reality in the Dinge an Sich’s own language” (1974b, p.
184). But the crucial difference between the epistemic humility that Campbell is recommending
here and the (hopeless) inability of ours to explain the Kantian a priori is that Campbell thinks
that we need not necessarily stay this way. As science develops, we may always come up with
increasingly better explanatory models, for any a priori mental structures are explicable to the
extent that they’re due to our phylogenetic history.
Naturalized Epistemologies
Centering around the 1920s and 30s in some parts of Europe and in the 40s and 50s in the
United States, a series of philosophers of the Logical Empiricism movement advanced positions
overlapping on the premises that epistemology should be based on some form of empiricism and
that scientific methods of explanation should reign supreme (Creath 2017). A related aim was to
rely solely on mathematics and logic as instruments that supply us with objective measurements
and precise structural depictions of the world through “observation sentences” (Gontier 2006, pp.
4–5). The movement is marked by a disdain for traditional philosophy, which was sometimes
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(e.g., by Wittgenstein) pejoratively named “metaphysics.” Science was seen as growing out of
philosophy and leaving philosophers with nothing empirical to study (Gontier 2006, p. 5–6).
This extreme empiricism facilitated a response, led early on by Willard V. O. Quine
(1969), that became the modern naturalistic approach to epistemology. Such an approach is
characterized by two primary tenets: humans (and their cognitive faculties) are in nature and
interact with nature in ways that can be readily studied in science; and the results of science,
including the theories and concepts, can and should be used in epistemology to understand
knowledge and justification. Some philosophers who accepted these tenets were drawn to think
of traditional epistemology as unnecessary, or confused, or an old “obscurantist” paradigm that
didn’t help us understand much (Wuketits 1984, pp. 8, 15).
Quine’s position is that the progress that had been made and the success achieved in
understanding the foundations of science by efforts to ground mathematics in logic, or in logic
and set theory, is exemplary (1969, p. 69). But he believed that this (reductive) effort ultimately
did not go far enough to “reveal the ground of mathematical knowledge,” so “it does not show
how mathematical certainty is possible” (p. 70). Yet establishing this certainty, or the
impossibility of certainty, is what epistemologists are really interested in. This had previously
been the aim of epistemology, and Quine believed that, after Hume proved that laws of nature
are not necessary and that reasoning from past to future events is not demonstrably justified, not
much progress had been made in epistemology (p. 71). A new approach was needed.
Quine argues that Carnap got close to developing a (non-circular) position, the idea being
that we could translate sentences about the world in terms of sense data, logic, and set theory,
though it was acknowledged that this wouldn’t establish certainty or allow hypotheses of science
to be proved logically (p. 74). Yet Carnap’s work doesn’t complete the picture, and Quine
remains disillusioned by traditional attempts to validate science on the grounds of a “first
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philosophy.” He points out, in conclusion, that “The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the
evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately, in arriving at his picture of the world.” In other
words, all we’ve got for us to study is what we can observe using the methods of natural science.
Quine’s suggestion: “Why not settle for psychology?” (p. 75).
Patricia Churchland’s view on the matter is similar to Quine’s, and she comes more
directly from the field of neuroscience. Churchland believes that philosophers have been
abandoning the “grand old paradigm” that emerged from the questions and solutions that first
concerned Descartes, Locke, and Hume, and then even the Logical Empiricists (1987, p. 546).
She noticed how some of the concepts that arose out of the early modern controversies had been
getting less and less serious attention, and that more philosophers were questioning whether it’s
not “bizarre” to think that “a theory of meaning that has nothing whatever to do with human
psychology or neurophysiology can explain the meaningfulness of language and how
representational structures relate to the world” (p. 545). Moreover, there are now “remarkable
new developments in cognitive neurobiology which encourage us to think that a new and
encompassing paradigm is emerging” (p. 546). Churchland points out that our brain and nervous
system, as those of other organisms, evolved to enable us to cope with the ecological niche we
find ourselves in, not necessarily to enable us to accumulate facts as propositional statements:
“Nervous systems are not general-purpose computers” (p. 548). In other words, the scientific
evidence doesn’t support that our cognition is in some sense pure of biological constraints, the
structures and cognitive mechanisms that evolved to help us survive rather than to think
abstractly, as was traditionally assumed. Therefore, the epistemological theories we develop
concerning information processing should be thoroughly informed by experiment (p. 552).
Churchland is arguing that epistemology had been on the wrong approach to the problem
of how we are able to represent reality and that, since it’s the nervous system that represents,

13

“the fundamental epistemological question can be reformulated thus: How does the brain work?”
(p. 546). This question calls for description. It doesn’t suggest a way to develop a normative
epistemology of how we can form justified beliefs. Yet Churchland does not want to eliminate
normativity out of epistemology. Rather, we should begin with adequate definitions of reasoning
(for completing computational or representational tasks), and then we can hope to identify what
it means to reason well (p. 546).
Franz Wuketits, a key thinker bridging the naturalized approach in epistemology to EE,
makes it his goal to avoid “metaphysical obscurantism”—traditional philosophical ruts in which
some thinkers have gotten hopelessly stuck because they’ve been pursuing the wrong problems.
He suggests that we instead embrace a critical approach that saves the objectivity of science
without committing us to naive views of realism (Wuketits 1984, p. 15). We must admit that
each organism requires a realistic “calculation of the structures of the external world” to be able
to cope with the specifics of its environment (p. 14). Organisms are “hypothetical realists” in that
they come into the world with a system of hypotheses about their environment—about how the
world operates and how to form schemes of reaction. That’s all we know for sure because we
humans are such organisms, and we should restrict our epistemological questions accordingly.
But EE goes beyond non-evolutionary naturalized epistemology by aiming to identify how the
evolutionary origin of specific features of our biology affects our thinking and to use this
knowledge in answering questions of epistemology. To this end, EE relies on evolutionary
theory, so we now turn to the early history of evolution’s ripening in the scientific community.
Initial Darwinian Grounds for Evolutionary Explanations
Before we examine the specific arguments made in the EE literature, it will help to first
explain how scientific developments in the mid-19th century were the necessary foundation upon
which EE was able to form. I will also show that EE is not simply a Darwinian philosophy, if we
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take the term to mean Darwin’s own view of evolution as being due solely to chance variations
and natural selection. There have been over the years several accounts of mechanisms in
evolution—how and why evolution occurs. The view of evolution’s mechanisms that one takes
will dictate the way epistemology can be evolutionary.
Although early in the 19th century some people had already accepted organic evolution
as a type of global unfolding that governs the universe, it was Darwin’s Origin of Species in
1859 that “changed evolution from fanciful speculation to established fact” (Ruse 1998, p. 2).
Darwin’s huge contribution to science was that natural selection operating on random variation is
what drives evolutionary change. So long as there is variation across the generations of a species,
selective pressures will result in adaptations and diversity in nature (Ruse 1998, p. 16). There
remained no need to invoke teleological doctrines to explain even complex and sophisticated
natural phenomena. Furthermore, Darwin outlined the cornerstones of what became the field of
evolutionary psychology. In his later books he shows both that humans stem from the animal
kingdom and that human mental abilities evolved naturally. As Ruse puts it, “If you take Darwin
seriously … then the special status of Homo sapiens is gone for ever” (1998, p. 104).
Contemporaneously with Darwin, Herbert Spencer was known for applying insights of
natural selection to psychology and sociology, and his psychology was itself sometimes seen as
offering parts of an epistemology (Wuketits 1990, pp. 1–2). Spencer was kind of forerunner of
EE, drawing links between the evolutionary development of organisms and the development of
culture (pp. 35–36). Unlike Spencer’s, however, Darwin’s work showing that natural selection is
the primary mechanism behind the evolution of human psychology was “founded on a mass of
empirical evidence and did not lack scientific rigour” (pp. 1–2). Still, Darwin recognized
Spencer’s contributions and wrote that “Psychology will be securely based on the foundation
already well laid by Mr. Herbert Spencer, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental
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power and capacity by gradation” (Darwin 1875, p. 428). The attempt to explain how and why
we think the way we do using naturalistic concepts alone is therefore nothing new.
Works by proto–evolutionary epistemologists—which besides Spencer included Ernest
Haeckel, Georg Simmel, and others—provided the basis for the premise of EE that human
cognition is biologically constrained and explainable partly in evolutionary terms (Campbell
1974, pp. 437–440; Wuketits 1990, p. 2). With the observation that the human mind evolved just
like all other organs, it seemed fitting to some naturalistically-inclined philosophers to expand on
this science to address problems in epistemology.
The Stance of EE and a few Prominent Views
Early EE Work: Evolution as a Cognition Process
Evolutionary epistemology takes inspiration from and combines naturalized epistemology
with the explanatory power of evolutionary theory. In fact, EE may be seen as “a branch within”
naturalized epistemology (Gontier 2006, p. 9). During the 1970s and early 1980s, EE relied
heavily on the Neo-Darwinist understanding of organic evolution, defined as the synthesis of
Darwinism with modern genetics. As we’ll see later, alternative conceptions of the mechanisms
of evolution have morphed EE over the years.
The first sketch of EE came in a chapter by Donald Campbell in a book on Karl Popper’s
lifelong philosophy (1974). The chapter, whose title named this emerging field of “Evolutionary
Epistemology,” lays out the principles of the EE approach: it’s about having a non-reductionist
framework that is informed by and compatible with what we know about biological and social
evolution. Campbell introduces both the ideas that “evolution—even in its biological aspects—is
a knowledge process” and that the natural selection paradigm “can be generalized to other
epistemic activities” such as science (p. 413). His is therefore essentially a natural selection
epistemology as he aims here to take Popper’s philosophy of science to its conclusions. Although
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Popper was interested in the growth of conceptual knowledge by individuals and collective
knowledge by societies, Campbell applies the natural selection model to understand “epistemic”
structures of all life—from the rudimentary paramecium to the great Einstein (pp. 418–422). His
famous “blind-variation-and-selective-retention” scheme is meant to model the process that’s
fundamental to all increases in knowledge (p. 421). By this process organisms acquire fit to their
environment, and it’s the process Campbell believes is the emerging paradigm for explaining
teleological achievements at all levels of organic phenomena. Variation is blind in that the
production of variations is not informed by which variations will be more fitting; the process
works independently of any environmental conditions or survival needs of the organism (pp.
421–422). There has, therefore, never been a “transfusion of knowledge” or of mechanisms of
knowing or of fundamental truths “from the outside” (p. 413). Moreover, skepticism about
perception and cognition—including what we find in the ancient Greek skepticism of, for
example, Arcesilaus and Sextus Empiricus—is compatible with the evolutionary approach to
epistemology (Campbell 1987, pp. 165–166).
Campbell’s “evolution is a knowledge process” metaphor has turned out to be influential
in the EE literature that followed. To Campbell, knowledge is not just about believing true or
justified propositions. An animal’s instinctual behavior shows “wisdom” about the environment
and is a form of knowledge. The bacterium’s movements exhibit knowledge, and “The shape of
a horse’s hoof certainly expresses ‘knowledge’ of the steppe in a very odd and partial language,
and in an end product mixed with ‘knowledge’ of other contingencies” (p. 447). The upshot is
that our cognitive processes (and those of any organism) are imperfect, that our knowledge of the
external world indirect, and that our scientific knowledge is at best proximate (p. 437). You can’t
accept this and remain a “naive realist.” We have no reason to think that we can attain perfect
knowledge of anything or have absolute certainties.
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Gontier adopts part of Campbell’s useful approach to say that each organism is a system
of knowledge that represents and contains information about its external world—whether or not
the organism uses language or has a brain or sensory organs (2006, p. 10). Although evolution
involves undirected hypotheses (“in the Popperian sense of the word”) about organisms and their
needs in the environment, a reliable concurrent process tests each hypothesis: a hypothesis is
confirmed by an organism’s marginally better survival, or it is falsified when the novelty turns
out to be maladaptive (p. 10). Therefore, concludes Gontier, by studying an organism we can
learn about the conditions within which it evolved.
EE is premised on the idea that there are objectively real regularities and invariants which
make cognition possible. Vollmer (1984) admits as an empirical fact that there is “agreement”
between the world and our knowledge of it, and he writes that the task of EE is to explain why
there is this far-reaching agreement “between objective structures (of the real world outside) and
subjective structures (of our knowledge about this world)” (p. 75). The answer given by EE is
that it’s not a coincidence or due to pre-established harmony, as many people had supposed. The
answer is, of course, that our cognitive mechanisms are results of biological evolution and cohere
with “objective structures” of the world because they’re adaptations—“they are partially
isomorphic to this world because otherwise we could not have survived” (p. 75). But we must
not overstate this apparent fact. Biological organs don’t represent or portray external conditions
as some have said (e.g., Lorenz); an organ may not even mirror an aspect of the world, for it is a
different thing from the conditions within which it evolves: “The sun and the eye have nothing in
common” (p. 71). Yet organs that are retained over evolutionary time at least hint at what must
be true about the environment. For example, by studying a particular tool we can infer what jobs
it’s suited for (e.g., a torch couldn’t be used for unscrewing a bolt). It is only in this limited sense
that we can say that an organism represents or mirrors its environment. The fact that our sense
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organs are terrifically useful for our interactions with the environment does not by itself mean
that we get a true picture of reality (p. 72). Vollmer thinks Kant rightly detected that the knowing
subject’s innate traits have an important role in the formation of knowledge but exaggerated this
fact (p. 71). On the other hand, because the knowing subject’s own contribution to knowledge of
the world matters, the simple claim that cognition mirrors the outside world is inaccurate. This
leads us into the topic of feedback mechanisms and top-downward causation.
More Recent Developments: Systems Theory
Up until the last couple decades of the 20th century, Darwinian natural selection was
emphasized as the sole or at least the primary explanation of evolution. Yet it is just one theory
explaining evolution and not the only plausible one; other mechanisms of evolution have been
debated throughout the history of evolutionary theory (Gontier 2006, p. 2). Since the early 1980s,
a number of scientifically informed philosophers have drawn from sophisticated, breakthrough
models of evolutionary change based on insights from systems theory and nonlinear dynamics.
Dynamic systems theory appears to provide the currently dominant approach within EE.
One motivation for the new approach to EE is the desire to explain those elaborate and
complex patterns of fit between organisms, or social groups, and their environment about which
teleological explanations (or even explanations stirring final-causes talk) have gotten attention. A
leading early figure of this new EE program was Rupert Riedl, who developed key concepts of
the systems-theoretical approach to biology and epistemology (Riedl 1984, pp. 38–39). In his
scientific career, Riedl was interested in explaining the great harmony between (morphological)
structures in organisms and their external conditions. After extensive research, he concluded that
“to examine history for regularities, a consistent theory is needed” but that such a theory did not
yet exist (p. 36). He was not convinced that plain old Darwinism could sufficiently explain the fit
between organisms and their environment. Some apparent adaptations appear just too fitting,
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adaptations that needed a more sophisticated theory of the mechanisms of evolution.
In Riedl’s view, nature exhibits nested hierarchies of order, a fact that researchers
working in traditional Darwinian natural selection theory had overlooked, though Campbell had
discussed this idea without taking it to its scientific conclusions. Riedl argues that there is a kind
of “correspondence between cognitive and natural order” that cannot be explained as due to
chance—“One had to be the cause of the other” (p. 39). It concerned Riedl early in his research
days that it was generally accepted that nature, but not cognitive order, was explicable
naturalistically. He became drawn to the possibility that cognitive order is “a selection product of
natural order” so that hierarchy in nature is not a mere thought projection by us (pp. 39–40).
From his scientific research, Riedl found that humans possess a “system of hypotheses”
innately—that is, genetically stabilized patterns of cognition, or “hereditary decision aids of
living systems” (pp. 40–44, 46). Riedl maintains that this system of hypotheses evolved in its
particular way because of corresponding realities in the world. This indicates that at least the
cognition patterns that rely on these hypotheses are directly grounded in and selectively vetted by
reality, which serves to partly justify these cognition patterns. The first of these hypotheses is
that the world operates in a way that is predictable in a probabilistic sense, so we have an “innate
ability to count on probabilities” (p. 42). Not that we consciously evaluate probabilities in a
rigorous way when our well-being depends on it—it’s more fundamental than that. We notice
regularities, make predictions, and note when our predictions are confirmed—and all this mostly
unconsciously, including when our livelihood depends on it. This ability allowed pre-human
species to learn and develop habits to assist them with their own living conditions. So the ability
for an organism to learn probabilistic regularities during its lifetime and to infer based on this
knowledge, a hugely life-preserving capacity, is explained as having evolved in accordance with
a fact of natural reality.
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An interesting analogue is found in the accounts of human thinking by both Bacon and
Hume and even Kant. Each stated the fact that humans tend to notice patterns and associations,
or to rely on the category of Modality or “problematic” thinking. But these pre-evolutionarytheory accounts don’t explain naturalistically why cognition in the human species came to have
these particular traits.
Consider also the capacity for causal inference: noticing patterns when one kind of event
follows another kind and inferring that the first causes the second. This is, in Riedl’s view, an
innate ratiomorphic hypothesis (pp. 43–44). We often naturally and automatically jump to
conclusions about two coinciding events as being causally related, sometimes after just one
coincidence (p. 44). Kaspar suggests that this ability may have as a precondition the ability to
simply learn a “certain sequence of occurrences” (1984, p. 61). After repeated, and especially
frequent, coincidences of events in close succession, animals of many species can be conditioned
to react a certain way—they only need to bring up from memory, unconsciously, that the two
situations are related a particular way.
Hume noticed that people rely on the relation of cause and effect in tying ideas together
and listed this pattern of thinking among the three Principles of Association. People make causal
inferences because of custom and habit, which may be so strong and influential to our thinking
that we may often not notice their effect on us (EHU IV.1.8, V.1.2–5). Of course, this does not
invalidate causal inference; it doesn’t suggest that causal inference is unjustified. But, we may
ask, does this account complete the picture? For Hume’s purposes, we might not need, for
example, to inquiry into the underlying biological or neurological causes. Yet for those seeking a
deeper naturalistic answer, it seems that it’d be necessary to draw on a theory, such as evolution,
for reverse-engineering the mind. As Riedl argues, it was work in evolutionary systems theory,
applied to cognition in the 1970s and 1980s by researchers including himself, that gave scientists
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a powerful explanatory model, with evidential backing, of why humans and some animals
exhibit patterns of causal inference.
Another information-gaining process that humans exhibit is to ignore “the dissimilar in
the similar” (Riedl 1984, p. 43). This ratiomorphic hypothesis reflects the reality that many
things in the world resemble other things even though no two things are perfectly identical. For
example, no two fig trees, or rivers, or clouds are identical. Yet somehow we are able to
recognize two different things as being relevantly similar—we abstract away from differences
when we need to classify things in the world. Importantly, this is not a uniquely human ability:
many animals (i.e., primates) exhibit this ability to varying degrees (p. 43). This “performance of
cognition” is also what enables distinguishing between different species (for example one’s own
from predators)—and it is what makes Gestalt possible (Kaspar 1984, pp. 55, 59). It’s thus an
important foundational ability for developing basic heuristics in learned schemes of reaction and
even communication.
A fourth principle of cognitive order that Riedl identifies reflects the qualitatively
different natures of effects in a hierarchy based on whether a higher element in the hierarchy is
acting on its lower elements or, on the other hand, a lower element is affecting a higher element
(p. 44). The direction of the causation influences how we perceive the relationship between the
objects, and for this reason “the forces and final causes appear to us as distinct qualities” (p. 43).
We tend to see nested, component forces and mechanisms as contributing to a bigger structure in
a meaningful way, and we are naturally drawn to emphasize purpose in many explanations.
Humans and other primates exhibit this tendency to seek out the aims or purposes of objects and
events—humans in the most sophisticated way, of course. Riedl illustrates this concept with the
example of the bicep muscle in the human body: we can explain its internals in a purely
biological way (the physics and chemistry), but we can’t help but to also offer a teleological
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explanation in terms of the muscle’s role in the body (p. 44). We naturally perceive that the
physical characteristics of the bicep successfully make it into a muscle that bridges the shoulder
joint and elbow—and we tend to think of the muscle as being there for this purpose.
Today, the guiding explanatory axiom in the EE paradigm is that of a dynamic process of
feedback-driven evolution. Because everything is natural—there are no Baconian “Ideas of the
divine mind”—we can explain both the human with reference to the external world and the
external world with reference to human cognition. It’s a powerful paradigm, and it makes sense
only if there is some kind of reality existing independently of living systems, a reality with which
our ratiomorphic apparatus evolved. For example, we’re able to learn because there is order in
the world (Kaspar 1984, p. 57). Living systems are not simply contained in “external conditions”
and do not evolve for independently changing conditions. Rather, living things (through their
phylogenetic history) shape what is external to them, their ecological niche, what is accessible
via the senses. “Schemes of reaction” are developed in tandem with what becomes accessible via
the senses, which is all that the organism with its biological constraints could possibly
experience (Kaspar 1984, p. 63; Wuketits 2006, p. 43). The a priori categories in our biology,
therefore, are the fundamental preconditions of our conscious reason, so “they are not to be
justified by reason alone” (Riedl 1984, p. 46). On this view, reason, whatever that is, is therefore
a naturally explicable thing to the extent that it’s explicable at all.
Wuketits has been another leading thinker bringing grounding to EE with systems theory,
which he believes is superior to a traditional adaptationist approach because it accounts for how
organisms partake in a feedback loop that influences their evolution. The adaptationist approach
made the external environment the center and frame of reference within which organisms evolve.
In contrast, Wuketits argues that organisms are not simply molded by their environment. They
don’t merely adapt. Innate cognitive structures produce a coherent scheme of external reality for
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organisms to shape their external conditions and constrain their evolution (1990, p. 153).
Wuketits thus takes what he calls an organism-centric stance in thinking about evolution. He
argues, moreover, that the fact that organisms constrain their environment is true at both levels of
evolution studied in EE: in the biological evolution of cognitive structures and mechanisms, and
obviously in cultural evolution where humans have conscious teleological intentions (p. 153).
Gontier calls the systems theory position a “New EE” which fully embraces the idea that
the organism participates in the evolutionary learning process, discarding the distinction between
ontogenesis and phylogenesis (2006, pp. 11–12). Gontier is motivated partly by how biologists
had since the mid-20th-century been identifying how natural selection operates at levels other
than just at the phenotypic, or with other units of selection. She writes that natural selection of
phenotypes is not synonymous with evolution because this selection is but one explanation of
evolution (p. 12). Alternative explanations have the organism conceptually at the center, taking
part in and influencing its own evolution. It helps to view organisms as “autocatalytic systems”
to the extent that “they are able to self-maintain due to the inner mechanisms they develop in
order to survive” (p. 14). Therefore, adaptation is not to imply a plain adaptation of an organism
to the external world.
The concept of self-organization, though for most of scientific history since Darwin seen
as too vitalistic or suggestive of intelligent design, has come back with rigorous formulations
based on extensive scientific grounding and fully naturalistic. Wuketits and others have argued
convincingly for sophisticated naturalistic accounts of some kinds of complex phenomena. The
idea is that living systems are hierarchically organized and “open” at various levels of biological
order in the sense that internal systems interact with the other levels and constrain the form and
extent of the organism’s adaptability (Wuketits 2006, p. 38). There is ongoing feedback and
causation directed both up and down the hierarchy (c.f. Campbell 1974b). Kaspar writes that,
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although classical thermodynamics may seem to prohibit the self-ordering of natural systems, in
fact evolution is about open systems that need to be taken with the context of their surroundings
(Kaspar 1984, p. 51). At every level of complexity in organic structures, selection is active in
“testing” sub-components within their direct surroundings, or, more precisely, within the “next
subordinated system” (p. 53). Therefore, to understand large complex systems, we need to see
each nested hierarchy as being selected for within its own immediate context—not as selected to
contribute to the organism viewed at the broadest level. There are evolutionary feedback cycles
at every level of hierarchically organized systems (pp. 51–53). Each structure in a biological
system is adapted to one part of the environment, so “organisms do not represent the world ‘in
itself’, but only in the pragmatic sense, obtain ‘knowledge’ about conditions which are relevant
in a concrete situation” (p. 54). Cognition-gaining is driven by the same principle of selforganization that drives the development of nervous systems (p. 55).
Drawing on such theoretical models is nothing new to biology. Weber and Depew (1996)
demonstrate how, from the earliest days of work in evolutionary theory, biologists have been
assisted by models in physics (especially dynamics) for clarifying and quantifying concepts.
There has been “a vital and vitalizing connection between Darwinism and dynamics,” and even
though Darwinian research has always had some conception of natural selection at its core, the
precise formulation of selection has been adjusted several times (pp. 33–34). Weber and Depew
report that a new series of natural selection theories are taking account of growth in the field of
nonlinear dynamics, which studies and explains self-organization in complex systems (p. 34).
Self-organization as conceived of by the authors is evident in genetic development, where it is
not just chance and natural selection in operation (p. 38). The selection that occurs at this level
obviously does not have organisms as the unit of selection, a fact which calls for a more general
formulation of natural selection that can apply to organisms (in the study of phylogenesis) as
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well as to genes (in the study of both phylogenesis and ontogenesis) (p. 39). The problem is that
Darwinian evolution, even in the Modern Synthesis, did not anticipate the work that would be
done with the very small (genes) and the very large (phyla), so plain Darwinian selectionism,
though valid for a certain range of phenomena, does not explain evolution outside of this range
(pp. 40–41). We should view natural selection and self-organization as “two aspects of a single
evolutionary process,” so this does not threaten the status of Darwinian natural selection as
crucial to evolution (p. 45). The authors aim to have their model of evolution explain, in a fully
naturalistic way, much phenomena that had hitherto attracted teleological concepts (p. 57).
The point of this overview of modern EE is to show that EE goes beyond extending the
traditional Darwinian model of evolution: it questions old models and contributes to a framework
that is based on interdisciplinary scientific theories, thereby feeding back to the science. Changes
in culture have been taken into the explanatory scope of these theories. There’s a long history of
attempts to explain cultural change and belief systems; we turn now to this topic and view it
through the lens of evolutionary epistemology.
Another Program in EE: Scientific Development is Analogous to Biological Evolution
The other program within EE developed mostly independently of epistemologies of
cognition and is about describing cultural change and theory change (and even methodology
change) in science; call it EET. The concern in EET is to construct a metatheory of rational
knowledge in terms of evolution, or with a more abstract selectionist theory of trial-and-errorelimination (Campbell 1974, pp. 413, 416; Wuketits 1990, p. 5). In the latter half of the 19th
century, philosophers including Ernst Mach, Alexander Bain, Stanley Jevons, Paul Souriau,
William James, and C. S. Pierce began to suggest that our belief-forming processes are not
simply cumulative and directly arising from experience but are a series of guesses and
corrections (Campbell 1974, pp. 427–429). Most of these thinkers were more or less acquainted
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with evolutionary theory, though it’s not clear whether they were directly inspired by it. They
believed that we never find the absolute truth about anything in nature but only arrive at
increasingly better approximations. Knowledge-gaining was seen as the process of making blind
or anticipatory guesses and then pitting them against other candidate guesses to see which best
stood the scientific trials and is retained.
In the 20th century, the leading proponent of EET was Karl Popper, who agreed with the
aforementioned 19th century thinkers that we are fallible yet urged that this does not imply
skepticism or relativism. Our knowledge can grow and progress. He famously described science
as a series of “conjectures and refutations.” In a correspondingly named book, his theory of (the
growth of) knowledge is based on the simple overarching premise that we can learn from our
mistakes. Although our knowledge (including scientific knowledge) advances by way of
unjustifiable guesses or conjectures, and although we have no way to deduce theories or even
infer inductively what theory must be correct given the evidence, we can refute conjectures in a
more rational and evidence-based way. Each tentative solution to a problem must be put to
severe testing. We rely on empirical observations and critical argument to test and eliminate
mistaken hypotheses. We gain some knowledge when we refute a proposed conjecture, but we
can never prove a hypothesis or even demonstrate that it’s probably true (Popper 2002, p. xi). A
hypothesis or a solution to a problem is scientific only insofar as it is testable.
Popper asks, “But what, then, are the sources of our knowledge?” His answer is that
“there are all kinds of sources of our knowledge; but none has authority” (p. 32). Popper finds it
fruitful to ask instead of “what source of knowledge is best?” the better question of how we can
“detect and eliminate error” given that pure and certain sources of knowledge don’t exist (pp.
33–34). So, on this view, anyone can conjecture anything and happen to be correct, and the way
we should approach any claim to truth is by testing it just as critically as every other conjecture.

27

The significant contribution to this topic by Popper was, says Donald Campbell, not
another answer to the questions Hume dealt with—rather, Popper changed focus and re-centered
the epistemological problem: “The central requirement becomes an epistemology capable of
handling expansions of knowledge, breakouts from the limits of prior wisdom, scientific
discovery” (p. 417). In other words, the central efforts are the study of reliable learning and the
criteria for accepting or to rejecting theories. Interestingly enough, though, Popper never thought
of his philosophy of science as an “evolutionary epistemology” until Donald Campbell called it
so in that (1974) chapter in a book on Popper’s philosophy.
Campbell builds on Hume’s and Popper’s idea that our reasoning and perceiving faculties
do not give us ground for certainty about scientific laws having anything like absolute truth. Our
faculties have evolved to help us survive, and we have only a partial grasp of the world that’s out
there (pp. 414–415, 437). He adds that the evolutionary approach to epistemology gives up the
traditional effort to hold back all knowledge until we establish that knowledge is possible or to
suspend sense data until there are indubitable grounds for its validity (p. 418). We have no
proven modes of knowing without presuppositions, and we can’t refute solipsism—but, he says,
those aren’t the interesting problems. The “problem of knowledge” is instead about “truth claims
descriptive of a more than now-phenomenal world” (p. 418). We should explain, for example,
when we can postulate unobservable entities or laws of nature. We must not expect independent
justification of a process of theory construction, and we accordingly need not hesitate to accept a
belief just because it lacks inductive support—we must apply it to our problems and see if it’s a
solution (p. 419). Campbell thus thinks that Popper’s definition of knowledge should encourage
us to try out theories and tentatively accept only those that stand as yet not refuted.
Franz Wuketits is noteworthy here too. Wuketits asks a few questions that had been
mostly overlooked in the EE literature, such as why exactly can we liken EET to EEM? Or to
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what extent is the one distinct from the other? Wuketits thinks EE is relevant to explaining
theory change because EEM and EET overlap on the premises that “evolution is to be taken as a
basis for cognition processes of all kinds” and that evolution is itself a cognition and learning
process (1990, pp. 8, 152). A continuum of information-processing levels spans all forms of life.
At the genetic level information is transmitted only by inheritance; at the preconscious cognition
level, many animal species and humans acquire information from signals by the external world
and can make small adjustments to their behavior accordingly; and at the rational knowledge
level, humans are able to take advantage of intellectual information and pass it to other humans
exosomatically, such as through writing (p. 55). Individual learning is more efficient and rapid
because it is not tied down to any particular biological subsystem other than the neuro-cognitive
structures that create a plane for information processing above the biological substrates. Humans
and some animals have individual learning abilities that enable them to transgress hereditary
instincts (p. 65). However, that the ability for intellectual information processing in humans is a
product of evolution does not by itself imply that the process by which knowledge develops (and
science progresses) in human culture is like the process of organic evolution. Nor is scientific
inquiry a direct result of natural biological processes. Nor is EET a logical progression of EEM.
Wuketits adds that the key aspect differentiating scientific change from organic evolution is that
intellectual information is transmitted “via exosomatic structures” (p. 166). So if the two
processes are in some ways analogous, this fact is entirely contingent.
Popper, however, would not agree on this last point. In Conjectures and Refutations, he
writes that all learning is done by way of unjustifiable guesses or conjectures, controlled by
criticism and attempted refutations. Any tentative solution to any problem is to be put to severe
testing. We gain some knowledge when we refute a proposed conjecture. Campbell explains,
also, that in Clouds and Clocks Popper sees the natural selection paradigm as “the universal
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nonteleological explanation of teleological achievements, of ends-guided processes, of ‘fit’”
(Campbell 1974, p. 420). As we saw earlier, a counterpart theory of Campbell’s is the “blindvariation-and-selective-retention” scheme (p. 421). This is, in other words, a universal law of
learning. Yet, even though Popper writes that “The method of trial and error is applied not only
by Einstein but, in a more dogmatic fashion, by the amoeba also,” he is ready to admit that “The
method of trial and error is not, of course, simply identical with the scientific or critical
approach—with the method of conjecture and refutation” (Popper 2002, p. 68). The difference is
that the scientist, but not the amoeba, takes “a critical and constructive attitude towards errors;
errors which the scientist consciously and cautiously tries to uncover in order to refute his
theories with searching arguments, including appeals to the most severe experimental tests which
his theories and his ingenuity permit him to design” (p. 68).
Should each project, EEM and EET, be treated separately in professional research, to
avoid giving the impression that certain scientific findings directly say something about what has
traditionally been the focus of epistemology? Many biologists and psychologists present their
scientific work as epistemology (e.g., Campbell, Riedl, etc.). Are justification and the status of
knowledge matters of science as well as of philosophy? One answer is that the evolutionary
study of epistemological or knowing mechanisms is within the domain of science while the
nature of science itself and of scientific theory change is the domain of philosophy. Or we may
think of EE as being both a biological (and thus scientific) meta-theory as well as a philosophical
approach to epistemology because of its normative stance concerning the proper way to answer
questions about the justifiability of our learning procedures. In any case, EE thus goes “beyond
traditional disciplinary boundaries” (Wuketits 1990, p. 4). To the extent that it is shaped by
science, it lacks independent philosophical motivations beyond the aim to have a unified theory
of all knowledge and learning. Whether such a theory is possible is, however, another question.
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Critiques and Limitations
There has, unsurprisingly, been reflection on and critique of the evolutionary approach to
epistemology. The approach certainly has its limitations, and it’s been argued that some of the
conclusions drawn using concepts of EE, especially about scientific development, are not sound.
Having established that EEM and EET are crucially distinct, we discuss now the critiques and
limitations of each program separately.
Critiques and Limitations of EEM
The first kind of criticism pivots around the uneasiness with which EE is often situated in
the balance between being pure philosophy of a top-downward approach or being plain natural
science. Many thinkers are not explicit about whether their theory has philosophical aims or is
meant only to explain certain concrete findings of science. Some label EEM as both a scientific
and a philosophical position (e.g., Vollmer 1984; Gontier 2006); some say it answers scientific
questions while suggesting philosophical points on topics like morality and ontology (Wuketits
1990). Plotkin thinks this ambiguity in the purpose of EE makes it unscientific (it isn’t biology),
a situation from which, he says, EE can be rescued only if it comes to have its own scientific
basis (1987, pp. 295–297). At the time, Plotkin saw EE as not sufficiently grounded in science
though meant to address the problem of knowledge by science. The difference, he says, between
philosophy and science has to do with “the accessibility of the product of analysis, of a theory, to
empirical test,” where accessibility is “judged in terms of the intention of disciplining a theory by
empirical testing” (p. 296). Plotkin argues that whether cognitive processes are evolutionary
processes is a contentious, scientific question that “will not be solved by analysis alone” (p. 302).
To continue to be seen as at least in part scientific, EE must contribute a model that integrates at
least genetics, epigenetics, and cognition to account for how a set of adaptations can exhibit
“knowing” about its environment (p. 309). But if EE is transformed into a scientific theory, what
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philosophical relevance could it then have?
Löw refines this point among the objections he raises against EE. He argues that, though
EE is usually taken to be a scientific theory, it is in fact only a “philosophical proposal for the
interpretation of certain findings” (1984, p. 209). The problem is with the way concepts such as
“life” and “knowledge” get defined; the arbitrary definitions are intended to make it possible to
explain, naturalistically, the emergence of life, cognition, knowledge, etc. (p. 210). Yet the
resultant explanations fail to amount to being scientific precisely because of these definitions. EE
first is claimed to account for knowledge like any other epistemology and to do so using science,
yet it requires conceptual shifts that are foreign to science. It turns out to not help biology at all.
The definition of knowledge in EE—in which are included the fitness of structures in unicellular
organisms, simulation of external conditions by physical organs, and of course conceptual
representation of information—has no empirical basis and makes the entire program circular.
Making knowledge multi-level this way is “good for nothing” because this only introduces
equivocation to permit the higher levels of knowledge in life to emerge from the lower (pp. 211–
212). So the concepts on which EE integrally relies are defined in a way that end up making the
agenda of EE meaningless.
The start of an answer to this objection could be to admit that EE is not a scientific theory
after all and that its usefulness to science per se is irrelevant. Therefore, Löw’s objection is not
clearly problematic to EE if we take EE to be only a scientifically informed naturalized
epistemology (Gontier 2006). It would be the task of scientists to keep EE in check.
Another critique concerns the question of whether, in an EE, we can say anything about
the likelihood that our beliefs are true given that evolution is concerned only with fitting living
organisms better to their environments. If we agree that the nervous system evolved solely “to
get the body parts where they should be in order that the organism may survive,” then it seems
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we must agree with Churchland that “Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost”
(Churchland 1987, pp. 548–549). It’s prima facie obvious: evolution is an undirected process
that optimizes for survival, not for true beliefs—or any beliefs for that matter. What a living
being thinks (philosophically) makes no difference in life-critical situations where some
immediate response needs to be made. As Wuketits explains, humans remain constrained by
their “innate teaching mechanisms,” which were “selected in prehistoric times for survival’s sake
in a world which differs greatly from our world of today” (1984, p. 22). So why think that our
epistemic structures ascertain actually true beliefs? If evolutionary science cannot answer this
question, then EE falls flat on its face without helping resolve the problem of epistemology.
The answer is probably that we need to distinguish between different kinds of belief: only
some are about immediate external conditions, and these beliefs must be formed sufficiently
reliably to aid our survival. Other beliefs—conceptual or theoretical ones—that we hold don’t
matter for survival, so whether beliefs of this class are formed reliably is something we can
address without necessarily giving much weight to the fact that our epistemic structures evolved
to enable us to better cope with survival conditions. That the same or related epistemic structures
make abstract thought, an emergent capacity (Wuketits 1990, pp. 196–197), possible is therefore
mostly irrelevant. In other words, it’s not entirely true that cognitive structures evolved for
survival’s sake. There has evolved (at least in humans) a mental plane for cognitive performance
that is not controlled by its biological substrates. So informational reasoning is an emergent
capacity of the brain that is, in a sense, partly detached from its neurological basis. The particular
ideas we form are not due to or explicable by our phylogenetic history. Cognitive processes have
evolved because genes acting alone are limited in the way they can equip phenotypes to deal
with the environment, and behaviors that are due to cognitive processes cannot be reduced to
genetically endowed differences (Plotkin 1987, p. 301). Thus cognitive processes allow semi-
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autonomous decision-making for individuals within their lifetime. Even if much of our conscious
life is constrained by our biology, not all of our cognitive capacities evolved to only assist us in
forming useful “schemes of reaction.”
Critiques and Limitations of EET
About the EET program (studying the evolutionary nature of theories), Thagard expresses
various points of criticism. Viewing EET as relying on analogies from theories of biology, he
argues that “similarities between biological and scientific development are superficial” and that
non-Darwinian approaches to “historical epistemology” are superior (Thagard 1980, p. 187). The
difference he emphasizes is that an essential part of naturalistic evolution is blind variation,
which means that variations arise without regard to the specific needs of the individual or species
and are not corrections of previous variations, yet scientific developments result from concern
with specific recognized problems and are intended by scientists to solve the problems (p. 188).
Science proceeds by careful abductive inference as hypotheses are proposed to explain puzzling
phenomena, and, importantly, it can’t be that all or most scientific hypotheses are invented
randomly or blindly, for that wouldn’t account for the obvious rate of progress in science (pp.
188–189). Also, as Kuhn (2012) points out, the rate at which novel scientific theories and
concepts are produced in a discipline depends on the degree to which a scientific paradigm of the
relevant scientists is in crisis (when the paradigm is close to being replaced). Yet the rate of
evolutionary innovation does not thus depend on environmental stresses (p. 190).
On the selection side of evolution, there too is a difference between biological evolution
and theory evolution in science. It is intentional agents who select theories according to global
scientific goals of “finding solutions to problems, explaining facts, achieving simplicity, making
accurate predictions, and so on”—all of which depends in part on (subjective) motivations of
scientists (Thagard 1980, pp. 190–191). In contrast, natural selection selects in a way that’s
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pragmatic, without having underlying motivations, for particular local environments, and there’s
no way an organism can be inherently “fit” (pp. 190–191). Though in the evolution of organisms,
fit is a matter of the environmental context, in science we assume that certain universal principles
should be used to evaluated hypotheses.
This criticism by Thagard is insightful and correct if EET in fact extends by analogy from
evolutionary biology to explain increases in theoretical knowledge. As we’ll see later, however,
another way to understand the evolution of theories is by making it just a case of a more general
selectionist model. If explanation of theory change is to be seen as evolutionary, it appears that
such a stance is viable only under such an abstract model of evolution. This may explain why
Popper did not himself describe science as a process of Darwinian evolution. But Akeroyd
(2004) and Worrall (1995) have argued that key points in Popper’s approach were based on
analogies between the way biological species and scientific theories evolve.
While Thagard focuses on the causes and mechanisms of evolution, Michael Ruse attacks
“traditional” Darwinian evolutionary epistemology (as he calls it) also at the level of the path of
evolution. Ruse is concerned with late-19th and early-20th century evolutionary epistemologies
that are based on analogy from biological evolution, and he says they all fail (p. 31). Focusing on
scientific knowledge, he thinks this traditional EE approach is “beyond repair” (pp. 31–32).
Ruse first makes the same point as Thagard (1980) about the conscious directedness of
science but not of organic change (1998, pp. 56–57). The sources of variation in the two areas
are too different in kind. Variations in organic evolution are totally opportunistic. Particular
mutations do not occur because of certain environmental pressures (p. 54). Yet in scientific
work, scientists draw out discoveries “to do the job properly”—to explain observed phenomena
in a way they think is consistent with what is really happening in the world (p. 57). Scientists
want to be correct; they direct their work toward what they perceive to be the truth.
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Furthermore, there is the question of whether there is a sense in which evolution exhibits
progress. Ruse actually admits that science changes over time in evolution-like ways, more or
less the way Toulmin describes it: theories change gradually, always building on existing
theories, and any two theories about a set of phenomena will have similarities and differences
(pp. 48–49). Yet there is a crucial difference between the path of organic evolution and the path
of scientific theory change: “organic evolution is really not progressive, whereas scientific
evolution is apparently progressive” (p. 49). If evolution has no teleological aim, then it does not
result in progress per se. Compare a lion to a human. Which is better evolved? The question
doesn’t make sense, for it’s all relative to the environmental context. In some ways the lion is
tremendously more adapted and more capable—more fit—while in other ways humans are
incomparably superior. Ruse adds that, in Darwinian evolution, an important theme is the
“fanning out, like branches of a tree,” of species; this is why progression doesn’t make much
sense (p. 51). In science, however, we sometimes see theories from different disciplines coming
together, hybridizing, showing consilience and thereby leading toward what is often considered
understanding of objective reality. It makes sense to speak of scientific progress (p. 51).
Ruse downplays this objection to EET by adding that organic evolution “shows a quasiprogress: microbe to man” (p. 49). Organic evolution includes the emergence of increasingly
more sophisticated organisms. At the same time, there’s no reason to think of science as being
progressive in some absolute way. “Scientific progress is essentially illusory” in the sense that
we’re always going to be coming up with ever better scientific theories and concepts (p. 50).
New scientific theories tend to be better approximations than earlier theories though never
perfect—like biological organisms, always becoming more adapted but never so adapted that no
improvement is possible. Just as organisms survive because they “work better” than others,
theories continue to exist insofar as they serve their respective scientific community (p. 50).
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Andersson (2008) stresses that explanations of cultural evolution by means of blind
variation and selection alone are not sufficient (pp. 230–232, 241). Selection isn’t a good theory
for much of human knowledge progress because the way humans gain knowledge makes it partly
feasible to predict which belief or theory is likely to be more accurate, which isn’t something
we’d expect if theory innovation were blind like genetic mutation (p. 231). Of course, a scientific
explanation of the possibility of such prescience must not invoke anything like miracles (p. 232);
we presume that something natural explains this fact—perhaps there are real regularities in the
world and we can get good at predicting unobvious regularities. Since organic evolution is
assumed to not include ends-guided mutations, we can therefore at least conclude that this is yet
another point of distinction between scientific theory change and evolutionary change.
There are, therefore, various objections to both EEM and EET. Although future work
may resolve some of these problems, another kind of objection concerns the very nature of EE
and the aims for which it has been promoted. More precisely, if EE is a descriptive and not a
normative epistemology (Campbell 1987, p. 165), a question arises concerning how and if EE
relates to traditional epistemological approaches.
Does EE Compete with or Supersede Traditional Epistemology?
Have the leading thinkers in EE intended to do away with traditional epistemology? It’s
not perfectly clear if that’s the dominant position, but there are at least a few thinkers on either
side of the question. Some view EE as being in direct competition with TE, and some view EE as
superseding TE either fully or at least substantially. After explaining these views, I’ll present a
third option that has gotten less attention—that we may view the two approaches as mostly
complementary even if they are exclusionary in some aspects.
First, we can view the two approaches as competing. It seems that only Riedl and Gontier
take this position. Gontier thinks that EE “declares all other philosophical disciplines bankrupt,”
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and she explains this move as necessary because traditional epistemologies have all ultimately
turned out to be unhelpful (2006, p. 1). In traditional philosophy, she writes, the first goal of an
epistemology was to base science on some more foundational philosophy, as is illustrated by the
rationalist and empiricist schools of thought. The idea was that there is a direct relation between
the knower and either something that is known (this is rationalism) or else knowable (this is
empiricism); she calls both views naïve realism, a position she finds untenable (p. 3). Gontier
assumes a critical realist view and suggests that we follow Quine in attempting to base scientific
thinking on scientific theories (p. 8). Gontier says that EE is a scientific discipline, as well as a
philosophical a discipline intended for constructing a normative framework for epistemologies in
general (pp. 1–2). On the other hand, Gontier thinks, unlike some proponents of EE, that a goal
of EE is to develop a normative framework to be applied to cognition and decision-making.
However, because Gontier characterizes EE as “a branch within” naturalized epistemology (p.
9), it doesn’t seem that her version of EE can be a replacement of TE. You may wonder: doesn’t
Gontier’s position mean that EE cannot even be a replacement for TE? We’ll explore this issue
in a moment.
We may sum up this position as claiming that in EE we give up hope for a foundation of
all knowledge (and, probably, any hope for proving ontological realism). In short, EE competes
with the TE stance that we should either try to justify certain fundamental claims or a certain
way of obtaining knowledge, or, on the other hand, simply assert complete fallibilism or
subjective idealism—all of which EE denies.
Some writers in EE, however, present their theory as superseding TE, replacing the
“grand old paradigm” that emerged from the questions and solutions that concerned the early
moderns (Churchland 1987, p. 546). Quine wrote that epistemology, or something like it (now
that philosophers despair of real epistemology), ends up as “a chapter of psychology and hence
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of natural science” if we embrace his naturalism (1969, p. 82). Since TE did not get us anywhere
near the goals it had, we should abandon it and carry on with science as the primary source of
answers. Similarly, Churchland declares, “Since it is, after all, the nervous system that achieves
these things [representation], the fundamental epistemological question can be reformulated thus:
How does the brain work?” (1987, p. 546). Thus, this position aims to address mostly the same
questions but to produce explanations that are incommensurable with traditional ones.
A Third Option
Although some proponents of naturalized epistemologies would like to do away with
traditional epistemology, not all philosophers of a naturalistic bent think so. A third option has
not gotten much detailed treatment even though Campbell takes the position. This view is that
EE can be seen as either fully or mostly complementary to traditional epistemology.
Campbell said that, although EE is mostly about description of epistemological
mechanisms and processes, it “must also be analytically consistent” and that, when forming an
EE, we are interested only in those epistemologies that are “compatible with the description of
man and of the world provided by contemporary science” (1974b, p. 413). Therefore, any other
epistemology that does not deny the results of evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology,
etc. may be taken together with the results of EE.
Campbell believes that EE was developed because some philosophers saw traditional
epistemology as excessively and unprofitably caught up with skeptical issues and not focusing
enough on questions more immediate to our situation and answerable with scientific methods.
The EE approach is to view knowledge as a phenomenon to be studied by the methods of
biology. The focus, to repeat, turned to “handling expansions of knowledge, breakouts from the
limits of prior wisdom, scientific discovery” (Campbell 1974b, p. 417).
Gontier’s view that EE is a scientific discipline as well as a philosophical discipline
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intended for constructing a normative framework for epistemologies in general prompts the
question doesn’t this mean that EE cannot even be a replacement for TE? If the two fields and
approaches are about different kinds of things but sharing the goal to provide normative
judgments, why can’t each do its own work without being concerned with what’s being said in
the other? Similarly, Quine acknowledges that relying on facts from science to justify science
had always been seen as illegitimate. He contends, nonetheless, that there’s nothing wrong with
such a methodology if our goal is just to “understand the link between observation [Quine uses
the word interchangeably with sense data] and science” (1969, pp. 74–75). Thus his radically
new approach to explaining our knowledge does away with traditional epistemology only to the
extent that his naturalized epistemology makes the traditional problems pointless.
Similarly, epistemology could follow Churchland’s suggestion to set all focus on the
question “How does the brain work?” But this question isn’t clearly a philosophical question and
seems better suited for the fields of neuroscience or (cognitive) psychology. If we’re interested in
the “grand old” philosophical questions (Churchland 1987, p. 546), we could keep pondering
them while agreeing that scientific questions about the brain are also important for certain other
aims. A skeptic could still ask whether there’s any reason to think that we have any knowledge
about the world in the first place.
That is also the point Jaegwon Kim (1988) makes about Quine’s argument. Kim argues
that, since Quine’s naturalized epistemology doesn’t share the same concerns as traditional
normative epistemology, it’s not clear how it can replace TE or be a better way of doing it (p.
391). Kim argues that Quine is right in agreeing with Hume that you can’t through logical
deduction validate science on the basis of sensory experience (p. 386); but Quine also suggests
that we quit trying to validate science and instead try to study cognition only psychologically.
Quine’s proposed project is only descriptive, not normative or evaluative, and he’s asking us to
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repudiate normativity (pp. 388–389). If Quine was proposing only a scientific discipline
(studying how sensory stimuli affect cognitive processes), then his attempt to relate traditional
epistemology to his naturalized epistemology is, in the words of Kim, “at best lame” (p. 390).
Kaspar (1984) thinks of EE as a “biological branch of science” which nevertheless has
implications for philosophical questions about, for example, the role of humanity in the universe
and the non-existence of purpose in life (pp. 64–65). In other words, EE is philosophical only
insofar as it indicates something about ethics or meaning, and its real task is “to examine the
historical realization of the biological foundations of human cognition, and discover what
influence those fundamental principles have on reason” (p. 64). Accordingly, EE does not and
cannot answer all questions regarding knowledge or reason; it can contribute only to those
aspects of “thinking and recognizing” whose evolutionary history it can reconstruct (p. 65).
Kaspar thinks, therefore, that one can do all sorts of other philosophy while also accepting the
consequences of EE. Indeed, it’s part of the ratiomorphic apparatus to attribute meaning or
purpose to various things in experience (pp. 62–63). Yet any claim about real purpose in the
natural world is false if it conflicts with what we know about the naturalness of evolution.
Bradie and Harms (2017) believe that EE is meant to “provide a descriptive account of
knowing mechanisms while leaving the prescriptive aspects of epistemology to more traditional
approaches.” At best, they write, EE could rule out normative approaches that are implausible or
inconsistent with evolutionary science.
On the other hand, Campbell thinks of EE as partly normative, and Quine, in his later
works, retreated from the view that a naturalized epistemology should replace TE and conceded
that epistemology can be more than merely descriptive (Quine 1986, pp. 663–665; Quine 1990).
Quine ends up writing that naturalized epistemology is, in general, about developing increasingly
better heuristics for the “rational conjecture” of hypotheses in science (1990, p. 20). Given our
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aims for a useful and instructive science, epistemology can help establish which strategies are
good to attain this aim. Quine doesn’t see his position of making empirically testable predictions
the “checkpoints” of science as itself normative; rather, having testable predictions is what
defines the language game (in Wittgenstein’s sense) of science. The relevant purpose of
epistemology here is instead to offer such normative strictures as those of empiricism, such as
the denial of clairvoyance; science itself does not contain commitment to physicalism—the view
that everything in the world is fully due to physical (non-supernatural) causes (pp. 20–21). How
could science establish that there’s nothing non-physical? Nonetheless, thinks Quine, it would be
“idle” to define science out of the unlikely possibility that non-physical things can be accepted,
“to bulwark definition against implausible contingencies” (p. 21).
So can EE properly replace TE? The bottom line is that justification, and therefore
knowledge, is essentially a normative concept, and “the concept of evidence is inseparable from
that of justification” (Kim 1988, pp. 383, 389–390). A fully naturalized epistemology’s version
of “evidence” (sensory input) does not stand in an evidential relation to “theory” in that such
evidence can’t lend support for, or enhance the justification of, any particular theory, since
“evidential relations hold in part because of the ‘contents’ of the items involved” (Kim 1988, pp.
390–391). Moreover, to even be able to engage in naturalized epistemology we’d need to have a
theory for how to “find out what particular beliefs the given cognizers have formed,” but this
isn’t possible without constant normative evaluations of cognitive output as coherent beliefs or
theories (pp. 393–394). Therefore, an epistemology that takes the naturalized, in Quine’s sense,
view of evidence and theory must be constrained in its normative aims.
Conclusion
We have seen that EE is the product of a number of earlier philosophies that emphasized
empirical experience as the basis of philosophical ideas; it is the culmination of attempts to
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naturalize epistemology as well as to explain cognition and knowledge from the standpoint of
evolution. It maintains that biological aspects of evolution can be extrapolated to the analysis of
knowledge and reasoning mechanisms, even scientific reasoning. And it thereby challenges
every epistemology to account for the fact that we human knowers are natural beings.
Why should we care about this evolutionary way of doing epistemology? It seems that, if
a philosopher is interested in the old, traditional questions—for example, how to distinguish
mere belief from knowledge—then EE may not have much to contribute. On the other hand, EE
asks the crucial question whether, as had been suggested by Quine and others, such questions are
moot. Or, at least, perhaps we should forget about them, or see them as less important than the
questions that we have a real chance of answering using the methods of science.
What other positions, then, would you need to commit to if you take the EE approach?
One question that seems to have been unduly neglected is the appropriate theory of truth and the
related question about realism. Some philosophers argue that EE does not dictate a particular
theory of truth but goes well with, for example, some form of coherentism (Wuketits). Others
have argued that EE only makes sense on a correspondence theory (Vollmer 2004). Is one theory
of truth more compatible with EE? It’s not clear, and this needs to be studied more extensively.
Additionally, the consensus is that some form of ontological realism must be assumed in
any EE. Wuketits argues for a hypothetical realism, Popper for a critical realism (or critical
rationalism). Campbell takes a “critical hypothetical realism” (1974, p. 447). Other thinkers in
EE take other, similar, views. We will find EE acceptable only insofar as we find such a realism
acceptable. Even though Campbell shows that you can’t accept EE and remain a “naive realist,”
he thinks the limits of our senses only limit us and not the reality of the world (1974, p. 446).
Some adherents of EE have argued directly for some form of realism. Vollmer (2004)
mounts an impressive argument for the view that realism, as a premise of natural science, must
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be the most plausible view given the huge practical success science has had (though the success
of a theory does not demonstrate its truth). Moreover, the antirealist cannot explain a theory’s
failure but can only describe the failure—“in what sense the theory has failed” (p. 207). On
realism, there is a fact to the matter of how the world is, and a theory fails when it’s wrong about
what the world is like. And convergence is another phenomenon antirealists cannot explain: just
as there is convergence in evolutionary biology (when similar traits originate independently in
different species because of similar or identical external conditions), there are many cases of
convergence in science: convergence of measurements, measuring methods, and theories (p.
209). This is what we should expect in a naturalistic and a realistic worldview.
Yet EE seems to be unable to establish realism as the correct view. In TE, this remained
more of an open question. The problem that remains to be answered in EE is whether, perhaps,
we need not succumb to the conclusion that “the notion of a world-in-itself becomes obsolete or
at least redundant” (Wuketits 2006, p. 43; Churchland 1987). Contrast this to a view like Kant’s,
who tries to at least give a “Refutation of Idealism”; or Descartes, who tries to show there is an
external world. If EE abandons pursuit for answers to traditional questions on traditional terms,
does this imply that we need to re-define fundamental concepts such as truth and reality? This is
in fact what some have suggested. (“What counts for any organism is that it copes with its own
world properly” (Wuketits 2006).) This leads to a wholly new outlook on the realism-idealismantirealism problem, a matter that EE has not given a final verdict.
On another note, a tension I’m noticing within EE is that some thinkers present EE as
extending by analogy from evolutionary biology to explain cognitive processes or increases in
knowledge while others avoid talk of analogies but describe evolution as an abstract theory that
is evident in both biology and scientific knowledge processes. Therefore, scientific progress is
either analogous to (biological) natural selection, or it’s an instance of a universal model of
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evolutionary change. It seems to me that it was more common in the earlier days of EE for
thinkers to speak about how EE extends the biological theory of evolution by analogy (Plotkin
1987, pp. 302–303). On the other hand, Andersson stresses that EE theories shouldn’t consider
cognitive processes to be analogous to biological evolutionary processes: the two are variants of
a more general process of interaction, memory, and synthesis (2008, p. 230). Andersson thinks
that it helps to abstract away from particular selection theories of any discipline and identify the
general form of selection, since this enable us to have fruitful discourse across disciplines.
Extending another discipline’s selection theory by analogy “threatens not only to mislead but to
make discourse altogether impossible” (p. 230). We need a meta-theory that can incorporate
“nested hierarchies of knowledge systems; systems whose dynamics are causally interlocked but
that operate on different scales of time and space” (p. 233). That is precisely the kind of
framework for which EE may prove as a useful guide.
Finally, the philosophy of mind that one ought to take in a consistent EE has not been
fully fleshed out. Some philosophers subscribe to materialism, others to an emergentism. We
also have Wuketits, one of the most important EE philosophers, who at first held a materialist or
physicalist view but then moved over to an emergentism (Wuketits 1990). EE doesn’t seem to
imply a particular theory, except in denying dualism or any view that does not place the physical
substrates of cognition as a central component of understanding the mind.
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Annotated Bibliography
Akeroyd, F. Michael. “Popper’s evolutionary epistemology revamped.” Journal for General
Philosophy of Science, vol. 35, no. 2, 2004, pp. 385–396.
This author argues that key points in Popper’s approach were analogies between the way
biological species develop and the way scientific theories develop (385–386). Popper believed
that evolution in biology leads to “higher” forms, a process called orthogenesis, but modern
biology does not include the view that organisms evolve in any particular direction (386). On the
question of whether evolution is blind or random, Popper’s view turns out to accord with recent
developments in genetics (387–388). Organisms are modular to the extent that they can retain
features of predecessors while evolving, and they can develop responses to the environment in
ways that don’t mirror a random walk; this is analogous to how Popper sees science (388).
Internal mechanisms in organisms that constrain variation to bias it toward fruitful developments
are like (“planned groping”) orthogenesis in science (388–389). Developments in science tend to
be less Lamarckian and more Darwinian (391, 395).

Andersson, Claes. “Sophisticated selectionism as a general theory of knowledge.” Biology &
Philosophy, vol. 23, no. 2, 2008, pp. 229–242.
The natural selection component of evolutionary theory can be extended and applied to fields
other than biology, for which Darwin did not intend his theory. By identifying and applying
generalizable concepts of selection theory we can gain insights in disciplines beyond biology, and
there have been attempts to do this for several decades (229–230). Yet selection theories have
been the most helpful (even breakthrough) when they are grounded in empirical data, and
progress has been made in the areas of clonal selection and neurophysiology but not really in the
social sciences (230). (The author repeatedly says that explanations of cultural evolution by
means of blind variation and selection alone are not sufficient (230, 232, 241).) Philosophical
theories should be informed by science, or at least by basic observation (230). It helps to abstract
away from particular selection theories of any discipline and identify the general form of
selection, since this enable us to have fruitful discourse across disciplines. Extending another
discipline’s selection theory by analogy “threatens not only to mislead but to make discourse
altogether impossible” (230). Selection isn’t a perfect theory for much of human knowledge
progress because humans gain knowledge in a way that appears as if we can to some extent
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predict (unlike blind natural selection of organisms) what belief or theory is more likely to be
more accurate (231). The basic assumption that the scientific way to explain this appearance of
prescience must not invoke anything like miracles and only constrains theories but does not itself
explain what theories working within this constraint may explain (231–232). A theory may allow
“proximate prescience” at some level of organization even if this concept is forbidden at other
levels (232). We need a general theory or a meta-theory that can incorporate “nested hierarchies
of knowledge systems; systems whose dynamics are causally interlocked but that operate on
different scales of time and space” (233). The author’s proposed theory uses the three
“fundamental functions” of interaction, memory, and synthesis (234).

Bradie, Michael and William Harms. “Evolutionary Epistemology.” The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, Spring 2017 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta.
There have been, broadly, two projects of study within evolutionary epistemology: the first is
about the evolution of epistemological mechanisms, and the second is about the evolutionary
epistemology of theories. Both are based on analogies, models, and metaphors drawn from the
biological theory of evolution, but the two programs are distinct in that neither implies the other
and neither would invalidate the other if it were to fall. The author describes “traditional”
epistemology as the history of attempts since Plato to (a) distinguish knowledge from true belief
and (b) reconstruct all of human knowledge to show how it coherently fits together; but since the
late 19th century an alternative approach has been proposed with the starting assumption being
that, since humans are the product of evolution, some of the problem of human knowledge is to
be explained scientifically. Thus there isn’t a distinction made between science and philosophy,
and philosophy is not supposed to establish the validity of science. Whereas the traditional
approach assumes that the basic epistemological questions may not be based on any particular
knowledge, the point being to avoid question begging, this new approach begins with the fact that
we’re able to have some knowledge as natural beings and that our nature in this respect may be
studied naturalistically. The view called evolutionary epistemology is just a development of this
approach with evolutionary considerations, and insights in this area help scientists understand
certain aspects of biological evolution. Though in evolutionary biology there is a recognized
difference between development during an organism’s lifetime, as characterized by ontogenetic
models, and a species’ evolution, as characterized by phylogenetic models, in EE there is no
distinction made along these boundaries, and it is generally not emphasized that biological
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processes of knowledge gain operate significantly differently from selectionist processes across
time in cultures. Traditional epistemologies are normative, but EE can only describe knowledge
processes without prescribing or evaluating the merits of different ways of forming beliefs. Some
thinkers have proposed EE as competing with traditional normative epistemology, others have
argued that EE should supersede traditional views which, they say, have not brought much
philosophical progress, and still others view EE as complementary to traditional views.

Campbell, Donald T. “‘Downward Causation’ in Hierarchically Organised Biological Systems.”
Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and Related Problems, edited by F.J.
Ayala and T. Dobzhansky, 1974, pp. 179–186.
Natural selection works at the phenotypic level, not at the genotypic (181). There is in nature the
causation of particular DNA sequences (across generations) because of the functions organisms
have in their environment and not just at the DNA or protein level (180–181). Organism-level
selection determines the distribution of proteins “and hence the DNA templates guiding their
production” (181). Campbell gives the example of worker termites and the distributions of jaw
forms across groups of such termites; there is division of labor in that some termites are warriors
in the group with their particular jaws (but can’t feed themselves), others procure food, and others
build living quarters (181). Only higher-level (in the ecological niche) selective pressures—or
laws of selection—can produce social phenomena like this naturally. Campbell concludes from
the existence of such social structures in nature that “for biological systems produced by natural
selection, where there is a node of selection at a higher level, the higher level laws are necessary
for a complete specification of phenomena both at the higher level and also for lower levels”
(182). What appears to be designed at some level is explicable naturalistically at another level.
Yet he states this doesn’t mean the autonomy of higher levels, as if natural processes at the
molecular level don’t matter (182). One implication is that we each have beliefs in part caused by
higher-level social structures that we can’t always explain or show to be right or wrong.

Campbell, Donald T. “Evolutionary Epistemology,” The Philosophy of Karl Popper, edited by
Paul Arthur Schilpp, 1974, pp. 413–463.
Campbell begins by defining what must at minimum be true of an epistemological theory if it
should be considered an evolutionary epistemology: the theory should be informed by and
compatible with what we know about how humans have evolved biologically and socially by
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natural processes (413). Campbell interprets evolution to be “a knowledge process”—meaning
that an organism’s evolution is a kind of learning; and the natural selection part of evolutionary
theory can be generalized to understand other epistemic activities like thought and science (413).
Campbell provides a descriptive, not a normative, EE theory (413). A “direct realism” is not
compatible with this evolutionary model if the realism holds that we have veridical visual
perception, since we must accept that our sensory organs and the phenomenon of language have
evolved for purely pragmatic reasons and are not perfect (414). Our perceiving faculties do not
give us ground for certainty about anything like scientific laws having analytic or absolute truth—
as shown by Hume (414). These faculties have evolved to help us survive, and necessarily we can
only have a partial grasp of the world that’s out there. Popper developed a core part of
evolutionary epistemology by recognizing that the development of theories in science is similar to
the development of organisms by natural selection (415). Popper was not trying simply to give
another answer to the questions Hume dealt with—he changed focus and re-centered the
epistemological problem: “The central requirement becomes an epistemology capable of handling
expansions of knowledge, breakouts from the limits of prior wisdom, scientific discovery” (417).
The study of scientific knowledge replaces Hume’s problem of “reasonable belief” with the
questions about how to accept to reject scientific theories. So Hume and Popper weren’t really
trying to answer the same questions. The evolutionary approach to epistemology gives up the
traditional effort to hold back all knowledge until we establish that knowledge is possible, nor
does the approach suspend sense data until there are indubitable grounds for its validity (418). We
have no proven modes of knowing without basic presuppositions, and we accept that we can’t
refute solipsism—but those aren’t the interesting problems. The “problem of knowledge” is in
“truth claims descriptive of a more than now-phenomenal world” (418). So what we spend our
time on in philosophy is explaining whether and to what extent, for example, we can allow
unobservable entities or laws of nature. A process fundamental to all increases in knowledge is
“blind-variation-and-selective-retention”—just as that’s fundamental to “all increases in fit of
system to environment” (421).

Churchland, Patricia Smith. “Epistemology in the age of neuroscience.” The Journal of
Philosophy, 1987. pp. 544–553.
Philosophers have been abandoning the “grand old paradigm” that emerged from the questions
and solutions that first concerned Descartes, Locke, and Hume and then even the Logical
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Empiricists (546). Some of the concepts that arose out of the traditional (early modern)
controversies have been getting less and less serious attention, and now more philosophers are
questioning whether it’s not “bizarre” to think that “a theory of meaning that has nothing
whatever to do with human psychology or neurophysiology can explain the meaningfulness of
language and how representational structures relate to the world” (545). Moreover, there are now
“remarkable new developments in cognitive neurobiology which encourage us to think that a new
and encompassing paradigm is emerging” (546). Churchland suggests that “Since it is, after all,
the nervous system that achieves [representation of reality], the fundamental epistemological
question can be reformulated thus: How does the brain work?” (546). This question calls for
descriptions, yet Churchland does not want to eliminate normativity out of epistemology. We
begin with adequate definitions of reasoning (for completing computational or representational
tasks), and then we can identify what it means to reason well (546). Our brain and nervous
system, as those of other organisms, evolved to enable us to cope with the ecological niche we
find ourselves in, not necessarily to enable us to accumulate facts as propositional statements
(548). (Also the epistemological theories we develop concerning information processing should
be thoroughly informed by experiment (552).)

Gontier, Nathalie. “Introduction to evolutionary epistemology, language and culture.”
Evolutionary Epistemology, Language and Culture: A Non-Adaptationist, Systems
Theoretical Approach, edited by Gontier, Nathalie, Jean Paul van Bendegem, and
Diederik Aerts, Dordrecht, Springer, 2006, pp. 1–29.
The author begins with the claim that EE “declares all other philosophical disciplines bankrupt,”
and she explains this move as necessary because traditional epistemologies have ultimately turned
out to be unhelpful (1). In traditional or classical philosophy, the first goal of an epistemology
was to base science on some more foundational first philosophy, as is illustrated by the rationalist
and empiricist schools of thought. The idea was that there is a direct relation between the knower
and either something that is known (this is rationalism) or else knowable (this is empiricism); both
views may be called naïve realism (3). Kant introduced an important turn in the philosophical
tradition by suggesting, not only that our knowledge only comes from the external world, but also
that the way the world appears to us in our thinking is shaped by internal structures of our mind.
The a priori categories which necessarily dictate the kinds of ideas we can have about the external

53

world, and our mind does not have direct access to signals from our sensory organs (4). EE is “a
branch within” naturalized epistemology (9). The author says that EE is a scientific discipline as
well as a philosophical a discipline intended for constructing a normative framework for
epistemologies in general (1–2). EE makes normative judgments about how we should explain
cognition and behavior evolutionarily. Natural selection and evolution are not synonymous in that
natural selection is but one explanation of the phenomenon of evolution. Neo-Darwinism, or
simply the synthesis of natural selection with Mendelian genetics, is just one theory intended for
explaining the phenomenon of evolution, but it’s not the only plausible one. Each organism is a
system of knowledge that represents and contains information about its external world— whether
or not the organism uses language or has a brain or sensory organs (10), so by studying an
organism we can learn about the conditions within which it evolved. In this “traditional EE,”
evolution includes undirected hypotheses (“in the Popperian sense”) about organisms and
adaptations to the environment, which are either confirmed by an organism’s relatively better
survival or falsified when the novelty turns out to be maladaptive. Gontier introduces a “New EE”
that takes the idea that an organism participates in the evolutionary learning process even further,
a trend in EE since the 1980s that discards the distinction between ontogenesis and phylogenesis;
natural selection may operate at other levels, not just with the phenotype, or with other units of
selection (11–12). The external world for any organism is always changing. Adaptation is not
necessarily the primary mechanism of evolution. Though adaptation to the environment is always
present, organisms themselves also shape their evolution. Each organism is “able to change its
environment to enhance its survival” and to self-maintain to some degree (15). Therefore, a
universal selection-based theory is unlikely to be adequate for forms of evolution other than as
seen in animals as traditionally studied by zoologists, and even for this latter kind of organism the
active ingredient of the organism is important.

Kaspar, Robert. “A Short Introduction to the Biological Principles of Evolutionary
Epistemology.” Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, edited by Franz
M. Wuketits. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984.
Although classical thermodynamics may seem to prohibit the self-ordering of natural systems, in
fact evolution is about open systems that need to be taken with the context of their surroundings
(51). At every level of complexity in organic structures, selection is active in “testing” sub-
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components within their direct surroundings, or, more precisely, within each structure’s “next
subordinated system” (53). Therefore, to understand large complex systems, we need to see each
nested hierarchy as being selected for within its own immediate context—not as selected to
contribute to the organism viewed at the broadest level. There are evolutionary feedback cycles at
every level of hierarchically organized systems (51–53). Each structure in a biological system is
adapted just to one part of the environment, so “organisms do not represent the world “in itself”,
but only in the pragmatic sense, obtain “knowledge” about conditions which are relevant in a
concrete situation” (54). Cognition-gaining is driven by the same principle of self-organization
that drives the development of nervous systems (55).

Kim, Jaegwon. “What is ‘Naturalized Epistemology’?.” Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2, 1988,
pp. 381–405.
Western epistemology has been concerned with broadly two tasks since Descartes: to identify the
criteria of justified belief and to determine what we really know by those criteria. Modern
epistemology has been dominated by study of the concept of justification (381). The criteria of
justified belief must not include normative or evaluative terms, but epistemology is essentially a
normative discipline in evaluating how we must accept or reject beliefs (382-383). Quine
denounced not only (Cartesian) foundationalist epistemology but also traditional (modern)
normative epistemology (385). Quine is right in agreeing with Hume that you can’t through
logical deduction validate science on the basis of sensory experience (386); but he also suggests
that we quit trying to validate science and instead try to study cognitive processes psychologically
(387). Quine’s proposed project is only descriptive, not normative or evaluative, and he’s asking
us to repudiate normativity (388–389). If Quine was proposing only a scientific discipline
(studying how sensory stimuli affect cognitive processes), then his attempt to relate traditional
epistemology to his naturalized epistemology is “at best lame” (390). Justification and therefore
knowledge are essentially normative concepts, and “the concept of evidence is inseparable from
that of justification” (383, 389–390). The relation between naturalized epistemology’s versions of
“evidence” (sensory input) and “theory” do not stand in an evidential relation in that this evidence
can’t lend support for, or enhance the justification of, any particular theory, since “evidential
relations hold in part because of the ‘contents’ of the items involved” (390–391). Thus, since
naturalized epistemology doesn’t share the same concerns as traditional normative epistemology,
it’s not clear how naturalized epistemology can replace traditional epistemology or be a better
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way of doing it (391). Moreover, to even be able to engage in naturalized epistemology we’d
need to have a theory for how to “find out what particular beliefs the given cognizers have
formed” (394); but this isn’t possible without constant normative evaluations of cognitive output
as coherent beliefs or theories (393–394).

Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 4th ed. University of Chicago Press,
2012.
According to Kuhn, scientists always (or sometimes after an initial pre-paradigm state of general
confusion in the discipline; 15, 48) work within some paradigm. A paradigm is a scientific
community’s set of commitments to fundamental questions about what the world is like, what we
can know about it, and how we should go about answering the community’s questions (4). These
assumptions are based on background knowledge and concepts of the scientists in the discipline
from the education and training they receive and sometimes because of the definitions used for
various concepts. In evaluating the work of a scientist, the whole population of relevant scientists
will be guided by the assumptions that the scientists have in common. The researchers in any
field become qualified researchers by being exposed to exemplary instances of proper scientific
research in their field, which help them learn what is expected of them in the discipline (10).
Kuhn argues that most scientists throughout most of their career engage only in (relatively
insignificant) science that does not challenge important assumptions that most scientists have
accepted; most of their work is not groundbreaking but merely solves “puzzles” that have arisen
through the work of scientists in the field. This gives science its “peculiar efficiency” in solving
problems (239). Sooner or later, any discipline begins to encounter anomalies to the working
theories. Any anomaly to the received paradigm is addressed by researchers so that the paradigm
can accommodate the anomaly. When something surprising or inexplicable is observed, scientists
don’t easily conclude that their entire scientific paradigm is mistaken but see a challenge to
perfect their understanding of the theories in the paradigm or adjust some assumptions they
require for their theories or models. Eventually, a period of crisis comes upon each discipline, and
then comes a scientific revolution, which is a wholesale abandonment of one paradigm and the
adoption of another. The existing data either becomes worthless or is then understood in a new
way. It becomes impossible to compare theories in two different paradigms given “the data”—for
the data will be different in the two paradigms; this is what it means for theories in different
paradigms to be “incommensurable” (147–149, 156). This entire process repeats cyclically.
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Plotkin, H. C. “Evolutionary Epistemology as Science.” Biology and Philosophy, vol. 2, no. 3,
1987, pp. 295–313.
The literature in evolutionary epistemology grew tremendously between 1974 and 1987, at the
rate of science, but by far most EE is not science; it isn’t part of the biology science that aims to
explain how and why humans and animals come to know about their world (295–296). The
difference between philosophy and science has to do with “the accessibility of the product of
analysis, of a theory, to empirical test,” where accessibility is “judged in terms of the intention of
disciplining a theory by empirical testing” (296). To continue to flourish, EE needs a scientific
base of its own, since at the core EE holds that knowledge is an issue to be addressed through
science, particularly through evolutionary biology (297). EE studies also how humans have been
able to cause their own evolution to some extent by an “exploitive system”: some species (a small
number) have evolved the capacity to make decisions that “alter the natural selection pressures
operating upon these animals”—for example by choosing the environments in which to live
(298–299). The claim that cognitive processes are evolutionary processes is highly contentious,
mostly a scientific question, and “will not be solved by analysis alone” (302). To continue to be
seen as at least in part scientific, evolutionary epistemology must contribute to developing a
conceptual scheme or model that integrates genetics, epigenetics, and cognition to account for the
“knowing” about its environment that a set of adaptations can exhibit (309). The scheme will
likely be a nested hierarchy involving the levels genetic, genetic-developmental, and geneticdevelopmental-cognitive; “no cognitive process can ever operate as a tabula rasa mechanism”
but relies on the more fundamental processes in genetics and epigenetics (309). Cognitive
processes have evolved because genes acting alone are limited in the way they can equip
phenotypes to deal with the environment: “If these cognitive processes did not exist, then the
explanation of the behavior of these phenotypes could be reduced to differences in the genetic
endowment of individual phenotypes” (301). Cognitive processes allow semi-autonomous
decisions for individuals within their lifetime. Exploitive system: there must be involved a kind of
organism-influenced evolution through the organism’s decisions.

Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutations. 3rd ed., Routledge & Kegan Paul, 2002 [1963].
The book develops a theory of (the growth of) knowledge based on the simple overarching
premise that we can learn from our mistakes. Rational arguments are supposed to criticize our
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mistakes, and observations in experience are relied on to test our beliefs. We are fallible always,
but this does not imply skepticism. Our knowledge can grow and progress. All of our knowledge
(including scientific knowledge) progresses by way of unjustifiable guesses or conjectures, which
are controlled by criticism and attempted refutations. That is, any tentative solution to a problem
is put to severe testing. We gain some knowledge when we refute a proposed conjecture, but we
can never fully prove a hypothesis or even demonstrate that it’s probably true. A hypothesis or a
solution to a problem can be considered scientific to the extent that it is testable. Popper criticizes
the doctrine that truth is manifest—that, when put naked before us, the truth is recognizable as
true (8–9). Such a doctrine was central to the epistemologies of both Descartes and Bacon. It’s a
mistake to think that one can sometimes see that something is the truth, and such a view breeds
fanaticism and authoritarianism when it is said that you need to be in a special cognitive state to
perceive the truth (10–11). Popper asks, “But what, then, are the sources of our knowledge?” His
answer: “there are all kinds of sources of our knowledge; but none has authority” (32). Popper
finds it fruitful to ask, instead of what source of knowledge is best, the question of how we can
“detect and eliminate error”—since pure and certain sources of knowledge do not exist (33–34).
Together with the proposition that we can hope to detect and eliminate error by criticizing
theories and guesses Popper calls this position on knowledge critical rationalism (34).

Quine, W. V. “Epistemology Naturalized.” Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, Columbia
University Press, 1969.
Progress has been made in understanding the foundations of science by the efforts to ground
mathematics in logic, or in logic and set theory; and this success is exemplary (69). But, though
this reduction can and does help us better understand how some concepts interrelate, it does not
go all the way to “reveal the ground of mathematical knowledge, it does not show how
mathematical certainty is possible”—which is what epistemologists are ultimately interested in
(70). Hume identified the bodies of us knowers with sense impressions, but this put him in a
difficult position for justifying our scientific knowledge (71). Quine does not see that we’ve made
any progress since Hume in justifying our “knowledge of truths of nature in sensory terms” (71).
Carnap got close to enabling us to translate sentences about the world in terms of sense data,
logic, and set theory, though it was acknowledged that this wouldn’t establish certainty or allow
hypotheses to be (logically) proved in science (74). It would’ve not only been good to have a
rational account of “physicalistic discourse,” but it’d obviously be reasonably grounded because
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“The stimulation of his sensory receptors is all the evidence anybody has had to go on, ultimately,
in arriving at his picture of the world” (75). Quine suggests, “Why not settle for psychology?”
(75). Previously, attempts to validate science by relying on science were seen as illegitimate, but
there’s nothing wrong if our goal is just to “understand the link between observation [Quine uses
the word interchangeably with sense data] and science” (74-75). We get a “verification theory of
meaning” (80) if we suppose that the “meaning of a statement consists in the difference its truth
would make to possible experience” (78). A single sentence by itself can have no meaning at all
because you won’t be able to identify its implications for empirical experience. But a theory of
several connected sentences taken together will have meaning because the theory will make
verifiable predictions or have implications for the observable world (79). Epistemology, or
something like it (now that philosophers despair of real epistemology), has ended up as “a chapter
of psychology and hence of natural science” (82).

Riedl, Rupert. “Evolution and Evolutionary Knowledge: On the Correspondence Between
Cognitive Order and Nature.” In Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary
Epistemology, edited by Franz M. Wuketits. D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984.
The author develops an early systems-theoretical approach to biology and epistemology. He
believes that Kuhn “convincingly portrayed the process” of how paradigms, theories, and
worldviews change, but he thought that what still needed to be explained is how some insights
spread very quickly even though others are overlooked for a while until they resurface (35–36). In
his scientific career, Riedl was interested in explaining the harmony between (morphological)
structures in organisms and their external conditions (35–36); after extensive research, he
concluded that “to examine history for regularities, a consistent theory is needed” but that such a
theory did not yet exist (36). He believed that plain old Darwinism could not sufficiently explain
the fit between organisms and their environment. Nature exhibits nested hierarchies of order, a
fact that has been overlooked among researchers working solely in traditional Darwinian natural
selection theory (38). There is a kind of “correspondence between cognitive and natural order”
that is not easily explained as due to chance—“One had to be the cause of the other” (39); and it
concerned Riedl early in his research days that it was generally accepted that “Natural order was
explicable but not cognitive order” (39). Riedl became drawn to the possibility that cognitive
order could be “a selection product of natural order” (39). Hierarchy in nature is not a mere
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thought projection by us (40). Based on his scientific evidence, Riedl establishes that humans
possess a certain “system of hypotheses” innately—that is, genetically stabilized patterns of
cognition (40–44), or “hereditary decision aids of living systems” (46). This system of hypotheses
evolved in its particular way because of corresponding realities in the world. This theory makes
sense only if there is some kind of reality existing independently of living systems. Yet
commitment to this premise does not commit one to the position that external conditions evolve
independently of the contained living systems. The set of Kantian a priori categories are “the
most fundamental preconditions of our … conscious reason. Since they are its ultimate
preconditions, they are not to be justified by reason alone” (46)—and we can study them by the
methods of natural science.

Thagard, Paul. “Against evolutionary epistemology.” PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting
of the Philosophy of Science Association, vol. 1, 1980, pp. 187–196.
This author considers the EE program that deals with the growth of scientific knowledge (not the
evolution of epistemological mechanisms), taking such epistemologies to rely on analogies
between biological and epistemological theories (187). He argues that “similarities between
biological and scientific development are superficial” and that non-Darwinian approaches to
“historical epistemology” are superior (187). An essential part of naturalistic evolution is blind
variation, which means that variations arise without regard to the specific needs of the individual
or species and are not corrections of previous variations (188). Yet scientific developments result
from concern with specific recognized problems and are intended by scientists to solve the
problems (188). Science proceeds by abductive inference as hypotheses are proposed as
explanations of puzzling phenomena (188–189). Moreover, it can’t be that all or most scientific
hypotheses are invented randomly or blindly, for that wouldn’t account for the obvious rate of
progress in science (189). Also, the rate at which novel scientific theories and concepts are
produced in a discipline depends on the degree to which a scientific paradigm of the relevant
scientists is in crisis (when the paradigm is close to being replaced); yet the rate of evolutionary
innovation does not thus depend on environmental stresses (190). And on the selection side, there
is a difference between biological evolution and theory evolution in science: it is intentional
agents who select theories according to global scientific goals of “finding solutions to problems,
explaining facts, achieving simplicity, making accurate predictions, and so on”—all of which
depends in part on (subjective) motivations of scientists (190–191). In contrast, natural selection
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selects in a way that’s pragmatic, without having underlying motivations, for particular local
environments, and there’s no way an organism can be inherently “fit” (190–191).

Vollmer, Gerhard. “Mesocosm and Objective Knowledge.” Concepts and Approaches in
Evolutionary Epistemology, edited by Franz M. Wuketits. D. Reidel Publishing
Company, 1984.
EE should be judged “Like any other theory in science”—by its explanatory power, testability,
etc. (69). Yet EE is not purely a scientific discipline, for it “tries to solve a philosophical problem,
to answer an epistemological question” (75). By EE the philosophical question is answered “with
the help of a scientific theory” (76). The question is about explaining why there is far-reaching
“agreement between objective structures (of the real world outside) and subjective structures (of
our knowledge about this world)” (75). Thus Vollmer assumes that it’s an empirical fact that
there is this “agreement” between the outside world and our knowledge of it, and EE is an attempt
to explain this fact. The answer given by EE is that it’s not a coincidence, as some philosophers
had supposed, or due to pre-established harmony, as Leibniz thought. The answer is, of course,
that our cognitive mechanisms are results of biological evolution and therefore cohere with
“objective structures of the world” because they’ve adapted—“they are partially isomorphic to
this world because otherwise we could not have survived” (75). Biological organs do not
represent or portray external conditions as some thinkers had said (e.g., Lorenz); the organ may
not even mirror an aspect of the world (71-72). That’s because the organ is a different thing from
the conditions within which it evolves: “The sun and the eye have nothing in common” (71). Yet
organs that are retained over evolutionary time at least hint at what must be true about the
environment (72). For example, by studying a particular tool we can infer what jobs it’s suited for
(e.g., a torch couldn’t be used for unscrewing a bolt). It is only in this limited sense that we can
say that an organism represents or mirrors its environment. And the fact that our sense organs are
terrifically useful for our interactions with the environment does not mean that we get a true
picture of reality by our senses (72). Kant rightly detected that the knowing subject has an
important role in the formation of knowledge, yet he exaggerated it (71). The simplistic empiricist
claim that cognition mirrors the outside world is incorrect. The knowing subject’s own
contribution to knowledge of the world is important.

Vollmer, Gerhard. “New arguments in evolutionary epistemology.” Ludus Vitalis, vol. 12, no.
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21, 2004, pp. 197–212.
Evolutionary epistemology is constitutively based on the theory of organic evolution (199, 208).
Vollmer discusses “the biological evolution of cognitive faculties”—not the development of
science using evolutionary concepts, which he calls evolutionary philosophy of science (199).
When the brain constructs a picture of the world from the signals that flow from our sense organs,
this picture is not fully dictated by external stimuli or by the sense organs themselves. Coherent
cognition is possible because of the structures and mechanisms that have evolved for the human
brain, and we naturally experience these in-built features as innate or even necessary. What may
seem to us to be innate human nature is explainable by the framework of EE, a naturalistic
position (197–198). Thinking is all done by the brain, which as an organ evolved organically to
enable us to get by in what to us is a world of medium dimensions—the “mesocosm” (198).
Evolution does not mean that the best possible features evolve but rather only that the most fitting
adaptations will thrive best and be passed on to progeny, and the human brain and cognitive
faculties for that reason evolved just to aid our survival in a subset of reality. Within this
mesocosm, our natural intuitions, spontaneous judgments, and physical perceptions are generally
reliable, but beyond the mesocosm, such as when doing scientific work with the very small, the
very large, or the very complicated, human intuition fails regularly (198). EE does not include the
idea that all epistemological problems can or should be solved by reference to evolution, but it
does rest all of epistemology on organic evolution; the main idea is that “the evolutionary origin
of our cognitive faculties plays an important role for epistemology, both explanatory and critical”
(199). EE is distinguished as naturalistic by two traits: “by its universal claim [that “all over the
world there are no secrets”] and by the limitation of tools being admitted for the description and
explanation of the world” (199). Evolutionary epistemology defends a hypothetical realism which
is characterized by realism at three levels: (1) ontological realism, which says that “there is a real
world independent (for its existence) of our consciousness, lawfully structured, and quasicontinuous”; (2) epistemological realism, which says that “this world is partially knowable and
understandable by perception, thinking, and an intersubjective science”; (3) fallibilism, which
says that “our knowledge about this world is hypothetical and always preliminary” (200). We can
get a better grasp of which human characteristics are genetically innate by comparing languages
of different human groups (203–204). Realism is a fundamental premise of natural science; the
huge successes of science testify to the realities presupposed by science. Advances and
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accomplished goals in science support realism, but we could always have several empirically
equivalent theories that contradict each other in their basic premises, which indicates that the
success of a theory does not demonstrate its truth (206). The existence of failed theories is a better
argument for realism than the existence of successful theories (207). The antirealist cannot
explain a theory’s failure; the antirealist can only describe the failure—describe “in what sense
the theory has failed” (207). The realist, however, explains a failed theory as being wrong about
what the world is like. On realism, there is a fact to the matter of how the world is, and a theory
fails when it’s off the mark (207). Antirealists cannot explain the phenomenon of convergence,
but realists explain it as possible (maybe even bound to happen) because there are real structures
in the world which different people may observe independently (209).

Weber, Bruce H., and David J. Depew. “Natural selection and self-organization.” Biology and
Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 1, 1996, pp. 33–65.
From the earliest days of work in evolutionary theory, biologists have been assisted by models in
physics (especially dynamics) for clarifying and quantifying concepts. There has been “a vital and
vitalizing connection between Darwinism and dynamics” (34), and even though Darwinian
research has always had some conception of natural selection at its core, the precise formulation
of natural selection has been adjusted several times (33). The authors report that they’re noticing
a new shift in natural selection theories that are now taking account of recent growth in the field
of nonlinear dynamics, which examines and explains phenomena of self-organization in complex
systems (34). This should not be seen as a threat to the more traditional Darwinian models, for
there may be fruitful results from evolutionary explanations that take into account chance and
self-organization along with law-like conceptions of natural selection. Self-organization as
conceived of by the authors is evident in genetic development, where it is not just chance and
natural selection in operation (38). The natural selection that occurs at this level obviously is not
about organisms being the unit of selection; this calls for a more general formulation of natural
selection that can apply to organisms (in the study of phylogenesis) as well as to genes (in the
study of both phylogenesis and ontogenesis) (39). The early conceptions of Darwinian evolution,
even through the Modern Synthesis, did not anticipate the work that would be done with the very
small (genes) and the very large (phyla), so plain Darwinian selectionism, though valid for a
certain range of phenomena, is unable to explain evolution outside of this range (40–41). The
authors believe that “Natural selection and self-organization are two aspects of a single
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evolutionary process” (45); and they stress that their explanation of evolution in terms of a
complex interplay between natural selection, chance, and self-organization—rather than
threatening the status of Darwinian natural selection as crucial to evolution—explains in a fully
naturalistic way much phenomena that had hitherto attracted teleological concepts (57).

Wuketits, Franz M. “Evolutionary Epistemology – A Challenge to Science and Philosophy.”
Concepts and Approaches in Evolutionary Epistemology, edited by Franz M. Wuketits.
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1984.
Darwin developed some important first cornerstones of what became the field of evolutionary
psychology, and his work was “founded on a mass of empirical evidence and did not lack
scientific rigour” (1-2). Kant did not explain where a priori structures (categories of thought)
come from. We can view EE as the “attempt to explain a priori structures of our knowledge via
evolution and to ‘dynamize’ these structures” (4). In this way there is a kind of phylogenetic
relativity of the Kantian categories. The first postulate of evolutionary epistemology is that
learning and cognition during an individual's (or an animal's) lifetime is possible because "all
organisms are equipped with a system of innate dispositions," which means that no organism
starts off as a clean slate (5). No psychological or mental states are explicable “without reference
to the organic level”—activity by a mind is due to specific arrangements of neurons (8); thus the
mental life of humans can be understood only by studying the neurological basis of cognition (8).
He stresses that ontological reductionism does not follow, and he says he adopts the emergentist
view that “patterns of interaction on the organic level led to the emergence of” psychological and
mental phenomena through evolution (8). Wuketits aims to escape from “metaphysical
obscurantism”—traditional philosophical ruts in which thinkers have gotten hopelessly stuck; his
suggestion: embrace some critical approach that saves the objectivity of science without
committing us too naive views of realism (15). For example, he calls classical dualism a kind of
obscurantism, a sad condition that is unsurprising given its not being based in science (8).

Wuketits, Franz M. Evolutionary Epistemology and Its Implications for Humankind. Albany:
SUNY Press, 1990.
There have been two programs of EE: First, there is work intended to account for cognition in
humans and animals by applying our understanding of biological evolution to the brain, central
nervous system, and sensory organs. The second program deals with constructing a metatheory of
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rational knowledge and explaining culture and especially scientific progress in terms of evolution,
or with universal evolution-like theories (5). Both programs accept that “evolution is to be taken
as a basis for cognition processes of all kinds” (152), and evolution is a cognition and learning
process (8). EE is about developing a non-reductionist framework taking as its most basic
principles that humans evolved and that human cognitive and social capacities are at least in part
due to evolution. A systems-theory approach is superior to a traditional adaptationist approach
because it accounts for the fact that organisms partake in a feedback loop that influences their
evolution. Organisms are not simply molded by their environment—they don’t merely adapt.
Cognitive structures produce a coherent scheme of external reality for organisms which shape
their external conditions and constrain their evolution (153). Wuketits thus takes an organismcentric stance in thinking about evolution in contrast to the traditional adaptationist approach.
That organisms constrain their environment is true at both levels of evolution studied in EE: the
biological evolution of cognitive structures and mechanisms and cultural evolution in which
humans play an active role with their teleological intentions (153). Kant could not explain where
the categories and forms of intuition come from; the answer of EE is that they are results of
evolution: a priori knowledge in humans is indeed “independent of individual experiences,” but it
came from “evolutionary learning processes of the particular species and thus a posteriori
knowledge from the point of view of evolution” (82). EE presupposes “the existence of some
kind of reality independent of any organism’s perception. [EE] rests on what has been widely
discussed under the term common sense realism” (189–190). Wuketits subscribes to hypothetical
realism, which is that animals take the reality of the world as a basic operating hypothesis. To
cope with the external world an organism needs to have a merely coherent view of reality, not
necessarily a view of reality that corresponds to what is actually out there (193). Studying
biological evolution can tell us a few basic things about how science develops, at least the
question of to what extent intellectual activities are constrained by evolution (152).

Wuketits, Franz M. “Evolutionary epistemology: The non-adaptationist approach.” Evolutionary
Epistemology, Language and Culture, edited by Nathalie Gontier, Jean Paul van
Bendegem, and Diederik Aerts, Dordrecht: Springer, 2006, 33–46.
Wuketits differentiates his form of EE by pointing out that earlier EE frameworks, unlike his
own, were based on or strongly informed by “the adaptationist paradigm,” the view that
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organisms passively evolve to fit in with and mirror their external environment (33). This means,
on the adaptationist approach, that all anatomical and behavioral characteristics of an organism
can be explained as adaptations, and that an organism’s perceiving apparatus gives it a true but
simplified representation of some parts of the outer world (34–36). This view has a long history
and can is seen, for example, in works by Konrad Lorenz, but it is now regarded by many modern
evolution scholars as insufficient. But a more sophisticated and recent view of the last few
decades takes an organismic perspective (or organism-centered), accounting for the way
organisms take an active role in co-evolving with their environments. Wuketits presents his nonadaptationist version of EE as better informed scientifically, and he believes that it also applies to
the program in EE that deals with the specific type of cognition in scientific knowledge (34, 37).
Living systems are hierarchically organized and “open” at the various levels of biological order in
the sense that internal systems interact with the other levels and constrain the form and extent of
the organism’s adaptability (38). There is constant feedback and causation directed both up and
down the hierarchy (38; c.f. Campbell 1974b). Each organism will be able to survive long enough
to reproduce to the extent that it’s able to generate a life-supporting view of external reality. It
need not believe anything about what the world may be like in itself; organisms, however, exhibit
how their picture of reality is at least coherent (39–40). Wuketits writes that “From the point of
view of survival, some of our conceptions of the outer world are simply better than others
although they do not necessarily tell us something about reality as it actually is” (42). But what
could he mean by better? Are some “conceptions of the outer world” thus more complete? The
epistemology of Wuketits makes the notion of a world-in-itself obsolete (43). He recommends
abandoning the notions of absolute knowledge and absolute truth (44).

